

THE DIVINE SUCCESSION

A Science of Gods Old and New

by

Alfred de Grazia

**Metron Publications
Princeton, New Jersey**

Notes on the printed version of this book

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
de Grazia, Alfred, 1919-*

*The Divine Succession: A Science of God Old and New
Includes Index*

1. Theology 2. History of Religion 3. Human Behavior

ISBN: 0-940-268-05-1

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Printed in the U.S.A. Limited First Edition

Address: Metron Publications, P.O. Box 1213

Princeton, N.J. 08542, U.S.A.

*The cover is a composition based upon Kandinsky's "Circles"
(1934) and two reconstructed friezes of the Temple of Zeus of
Olympia. The text was set on Compugraphic machines in 10 pt.
Paladium type by "Get Set, Inc." typesetters, Lambertville, N.J.
and the cover was made by Carol Stoddard. Printing and
binding are by Multiprint Company, New York City.*

to

Earl S. Johnson

melior magister myriadis

CONTENTS

PART I. THEOMACHY

Chapter ONE	The Genesis of Religion
Chapter TWO	The Succession of Gods
Chapter THREE	Knowing the Gods
Chapter FOUR	The Heavenly Host
Chapter FIVE	Legends and Scripture
Chapter SIX	Ritual and Sacrifice
Chapter SEVEN	Man's Divine Mirror
Chapter EIGHT	Indispensable Gods

PART II. THEOTROPY

Chapter NINE	Sacral Vs Secular Man
Chapter TEN	Ethics and the Supernatural
Chapter ELEVEN	Religious Elements in Science
Chapter TWELVE	New Proofs of God
Chapter THIRTEEN	Catechism
Conclusion	The Divine and Human
A Note on Sources	

FOREWORD

Plato could already say in ancient times “that when men first had thoughts about the gods, with regard to the way they came into being, their characters, and the kind of activities in which they engaged, what they said about these things was not an acceptable account of them or what well regulated men would approve..” (*Epinomis*) We should have to agree and add that the subsequent 2500 years have managed, also, to obscure the origins, characters and deeds of the gods.

Many philosophers have quit concerning themselves with religion, believing that the road to wisdom is paved with logical forms. I doubt, however, that they can evade St. Thomas Aquinas’ medieval injunction, to wit, “The name of being wise is reserved to him alone, whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe.” (*Summa Contra Gentiles, I,1*)

In this book we take up the history of religion and consider the meaning of the universe. From the first, humanity had to be religious. It is still so. Further, it will be religious so long as it will exist. Religion is ultimately hope, and humans live on hope. So goes, in other words, much of my story. But to my surprise, I have discovered that there is really something to hope for. The two parts of my book, going from theomachy to theotropy, pursue a way from despair to new hope.

At all times every aspect of the human mind and behavior has been religiously affected. No bit of culture escapes religious relevance or effects. I mean this literally. Such is the cultural dimension of religion, which will be explained.

That religion penetrates the fullness of history and culture licenses us to draw upon any and all human settings for

illustration and proof. Every person in every setting, no matter how secular, merits attention as religious man.

No trick is intended, no cunning definition of religion. Religion for us here is simply a belief in the existence of a metaphysical order, together with the practices relating to it.

The means that I employ to select, analyze, and report religious material will be recognized and approved by aficionados of scientific method. Not that the scientific method is used throughout; but, when I move off the frame of positivistic, empirical science, I execute the movement self consciously, so that an ordinary reader, a scientist, or a philosopher of science will be alerted and recognize in the procedure a defined and denoted mode of thought. Once again, no trick is intended; all of my cards are on the table.

What will follow, then is a narration in two parts and three themes. These themes are: religion as delusion; religion as politics; and religion as truth. Although treated vaguely in this order, they are also intermingled throughout.

Under the topic of religion as delusion are carried the most important components of human nature and the most important historical transactions. We shall name and discuss these. Psychology, anthropology, and history are the conventional disciplines most heavily brought into play.

Under the topic of religion as politics, we survey the religious aspects of collective behavior, showing religion again to be the most important part of social behavior, with the disciplines of sociology, politics, and philosophy most sharply involved. Science can explain every aspect of religion, but paradoxically, it is religion in the end that determines the metes and bounds of science.

Under the topic of religion as truth, we move into metaphysics. All that historical man has attempted to achieve with religion is adequately describable by the scientific method. Most of it is also disposed of as anthropological material, not true religion.

The residuum of true religion, which is also describable by scientific method, is not only considerable but also exists in its own right, functionally and eternally. This body of religion does not logically or essentially engage in controversy with science, nor with politics.

Religion is an autonomous human activity, a fact of existence, like a rock or a sexual discharge. It may be useful, but its utility is not its justification nor even ordinarily expected of it. We call this activity “divine,” meaning simply a person acting truly religiously. Appreciating the immediate challenge that will arise at any claim to the word “truth,” we hasten to ask for a postponement of its trial until more can be said about “truthful” activity. Few will object if, in the meanwhile, we define truth as an open question of religion; one need not fear being forced to his knees.

Part One

THEOMACHY

Man's moral record in religion is largely unacceptable, whether to humans or to gods, if such exist. No anthropologist, philosopher, or theologian is pleased with it. It has been continuously expurgated and in parts expunged, to make it look better than it is. To little avail. It still appears as total theomachy: a struggle of man against god, god against god, man against man in the name of gods, and man against his divine self.

Why should we be so unpleasant in regard to religion, most human of activities from primordial days to the present? The question sends us back to the beginnings of the human species, when religious behavior began. We seek to establish there, and thenceforth through the ages, the connection between religion and human nature, in mind and in practice, and to come to an understanding of the historical gods.

CHAPTER ONE

THE GENESIS OF RELIGION

To the fresh, mad eye of primeval man, the world was full of gods. The human mind worked so as immediately to create religion. It does so now and it did so at its beginning. This is a function common to all humans everywhere, at all times, intrinsic, inherited, irresistible, Religion is then naturally ecumenical; any two people anywhere can agree in general on what it is that they are talking about.

The mechanism is simple. The thousands of books, the infinite discussion over millions of fires, the pomp of parades, the grandeur of cathedrals, and the hysterical wars and killings about religion - all of this intimidates inquiry. Yet all of this, as we shall see, descends from the operation of the mechanism as if a holocaust would flare from a flint striking stone.

The human mind, as soon as it starts working, builds a multiple identity, a self-awareness. In the origins of the race, this trait is so pronounced as to set the creature apart from other forms of life. Self-awareness is the psychological manifestation of a physiology of the central nervous system, especially the cerebral cortex, which presents a person with the feeling of being at least two persons. It is like the bother of two eyes that cannot focus well upon a single object, but it is of course enormously more ramified and important.

Since the body is one alone, it is “intended” for one mind, one spring of action, a single commanding organ. Never mind that in some remotely related animals two brain centers occur, or, for that matter, that in man himself, there are such “lower” brain centers that have escaped the parturition which we speak about here as self-awareness.

A person has the instinctive appreciation of and a nearly total apparatus for realization of unitary conduct. But this preparedness for the life of an ordinary mammal is rudely challenged by the sense of an inner conflict of selves, which can 'change one's mind' and redirect one's energies at any time, with seemingly little possibility of control. It delays by microseconds the instinctive response that the mammalian physiology and neurology crave.

The result of the perceived conflict, that "I am I, but who am I that says 'I am I'" is fear. We can call this fear existential because it is the absolute quality of human existence. The fear is indistinguishable physiologically from the anatomy and process of mammalian fear that arises out of non-existential causes; such would be the fear of a blow or of a lightning stroke. If it is to be distinguished at all from animal fear, existential fear has to be discovered by statistical means, by logical reasoning, by experiment, by psychiatric theory. We assume, hoping to be more empirical later on, that existential fear is a "free-floating" fear overload that characterizes the human and is attributable to the "fear of oneself" associated with self-awareness.

This state of affairs called "self-awareness" is instinctively undesirable. Its advantages are ambiguous. It interferes with peace of mind; it blocks the instinctive action of the beast; it introduces unwanted self-consultation concerning decisions and evaluation of the effects of action. It introduces continuous distrust of the self. It requires, as will be amply discussed, an endless stream of devices and decisions, all basically intended to adjust the elements of the self to each other, some of them taking place within the bodily frame, others occurring in interpretations of and controls upon the outer world of other people and nature.

Obvious schemes occur to the human person. One is to stamp out the other selves, to produce a granite-like person unbothered by internal inquiries. Another is to kick out the other selves like unwanted children or undesirable tenants. The first method is

workable only up to certain point; many subconscious activities occur and leak out onto external objects, no matter how impressive the monolith.

The second method, expulsion of internal conflicts, creates the human's world, but is not effective as intended, either. A lady who has a bad dream, and then doubles her contribution to a church collection, may successfully lower her level of anxiety, but is likely to receive more cordial solicitations from her church, which, if refused, may give her more bad dreams. A boy who perceives a ghost under his bed will in time flesh out the ghost with various traits, motives, and activities. Displacements of anxieties, that is, are boomerangs which, no matter how far flung, unerringly return.

Since the struggle of the selves is essentially psychological, it can be called supernatural. Then it is even more proper to call the projection and displacements of the self supernatural. To become more focused upon religion, it should be said that there is absolutely no resistance of the part of the human to displacing his internal world, in effect, living his life - upon super-sensory or ultra-sensory phenomena. It ill behooves the source to deny its essence in the world outside.

At the same time, the operation of tying a world of external supernatural phenomena to the world of internal supernatural phenomena is invariably expressed in ritual practices, that is, repeated related performances. The lady and the boy in the instances above establish practices. The ramifications of practice are limited both by the environmental forces governing practices and by the tendency to reiterate actions. From action to practice to habit to obsession goes the continuum, a rating scale on which, given the object in the world to which people relate, the same people can be graded, like churchgoers from once-in-a-great-while to those who would rather die than miss a church service. Paul Radin has properly pointed out "that all people are spontaneously religious at crises, that the markedly religious people are spontaneously religious on numerous other occasions as well, and that the intermittently and indifferently

religious are secondarily religious on occasions not connected with crises at all.”

“Fear made the first gods of the world,” wrote the Roman Statius (c.45 to 96 A.D.). In the long history of religion it is the only theory to come close to the truth. And man, in return, is theophobic, full of dread of god. The first gods were also the first humans, a scheme of delusions to map and control the immense, live universe. Everything seemed capable of turning into a god; hence gods were in everything (as the early philosopher Thales conjectured). They controlled everything, it appeared, but were unaccountable and did both the expected and the unexpected.

The simple mechanism of religion is then self-awareness, fear of the self, fears or anxieties displaced upon supernatural or tangible appearances of the world, and the development of practices to control and maintain transactions with the supernatural appearances. The drive to control oneself (oneselves, we should say) is paramount and moves man to wherever his rears alight. Again, Radin’s anthropological surmise is acceptable: “man was in a state of fear, physically, economically, and psychically. Man thus postulated the supernatural in order primarily to validate his workaday reality.” His aim was “the canalization of his fears and feelings and the validation of his compensation dreams.”

The judgment of what is supernatural and what is tangible may bother intellectuals and theologians but has never been much of a problem to the ordinary person or priest. The logic of the multitude is foolproof: the supernatural is everywhere and is incorporated in tangible things. We shall come to understand science better when we appreciate the futility, yet inevitability, of its struggles to squeeze the supernatural out of the rocks and out of the mind. It is trying to make an animal out of man, just as the pesky theologians say, that is, trying to destroy all outward manifestations of the uniquely human person, if not he mind itself.

Mircea Eliade has reported will the state of mind of the “religious man” through the ages. (He uses the term as, for instance, H.D. Lasswell uses the term “political man,” as the “pure” or obsessed type of actor in history.) Where we employ the term “supernatural,” Eliade uses the term “sacred.”

“For religious man,” he writes, “the world always presents a supernatural valence, that is, it reveals a modality of the sacred.” Every bit of the cosmos has its sacrality. “In a distant past” (but why not include today?) “all of man’s organs and physiological experiences, as well as all his acts, had a religious meaning,” “*Homo religiosus* always believes that there is an absolute reality, *the sacred*, which transcends this world but manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real.” “For religious man, nature is never only ‘natural’; it is always fraught with a religious value.”

Finally, “the sacred is equivalent to a power, and, in the last analysis, to *reality*. The sacred is saturated with *being*... Religious man deeply desires to be, to participate in *reality*, to be saturated with power. This rounds out an accord with our ideas of religious genesis. Man naturally sees the world supernaturally. Reality is supernatural. His heart and soul go into tying this reality to himself, to gain its powers. We should say that all of this grandiose ambition is to stabilize his mind, to let him live unanxiously, unafraid, to be at peace with himself.”

How good it is to be assured of this, too, as the Hebrew Elohim assures man, that he shall “fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth,” and furthermore has given him “every plant yielding seed which is upon the face of all the earth and every tree with seed in its fruit...” Elohim is thinking and working like any ideal reasonable man would think and work. All is divinely created, by hard labor. All is sacred, therefore.

Yet, granted that humans are bent upon creating the supernatural and tying it into themselves, why should they

dispose of the credit to gods? Why should they not be frankly proud of the world that they create and control, whether it be supernatural or tangible? First there is the fearful fact that they do not control it. Second there is the fear that disregards fact. They fear that they may not control anything; man is born with an inferiority complex from not controlling himself. Third, there is the appearance of purposeful control of the world by non-humans, an appearance, one may insist, that has both invisible and perceptible substantiation.

Take up first the fearful fact that man does not control himself, or the world. Hence religion arises to drug mankind, according to Karl Marx: “religion is the moan of the oppressed creature, the heart of heartless world, the sense of senseless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”

Perhaps the most powerful suppressant of religion is the promise of science to give one such controls. “Serious” scientists do not pretend to such abilities or make such promises. On the other hand, they at least feel relieved when other “non-responsible” people, like science fiction writers or humanists or philosophers, make such claims in their name. “We are approaching the time when we will be able to control...” - and every human anxiety has its assurance - “our anxieties,” “climate,” “earthquakes,” “approaching comets,” “plague,” “birth defects,” “war,” “governments,” and ultimately “the challenge of death itself.” This wealth of promises emerges from the instruments and procedures of scientific method, a process finding its way only through provably material entities.

For those who doubt the fulfillment of these promises, the outlooks of cynicism, stoicism, and pessimism - or, alternatively, religion - are available. A society dominated by the scientific outlook will, however, endeavor to persuade many of these of its promises, and for that will take over all of the trappings of propaganda and organized pressures developed over the ages by religions, and, later, political systems. The secular society is then in being.

However, there is still the fear that disregards fact. There is a factual element in anxiety, but additionally the aforementioned existential element. It is highly probable that no change in the human condition can erase this anxiety except the eradication of the human in man. Self-awareness can be de-trained, stunned and doped, but never with complete success and never over a whole population for very long. If it could be done, it would long ago have been accomplished. We may suppose that most cultures, in one way or another, have tried to do so, with no lasting effect. Man has achieved every imaginably bad society except one of lasting soullessness.

But fear alone might bring forth the supernatural, and the ways of dealing with it, without gods, unless some inherent part of religious mechanism demanded them. For this we require both an internal and external cause. The divine being must be both in us and in nature.

The internal sequence may be suggested. If it is the plural self that disturbs our peace of mind, then the infinitely varied displacements of this self that are employed to ease the fears engendered by the civil strife of the ego are likely often to emanate as living forms. That is, the world created by the human mind is animated. The world is alive.

It is an absurd but common notion, fostered unfortunately by scientists who are disciplined observers trained precisely to observe objects as “stripped-down,” that the human neatly undresses his thoughts of their libido before placing them upon the world. To the contrary, the human is naturally surprised, like the child bumping his head on a table, when whatever he encounters turns out to be unalive according to the battery of tests that his mind applies consequent to the encounter. “Everything is alive until proven dead” is the natural psychic principle to go along with “Everything is sacred, unless demonstrated to be secular.”

To say then that a natural force has to be animated into a god by some separate superstition which the observer must be trained to apply is incorrect. Depending upon its impact, the force is a

god or a manifestation thereof. It is historically, as well as psychologically, incorrect to think that humans invented gods as a kind of convenience to collect their thoughts and then gave them names. It is more likely that gods were observed and in the very process of perception named by ejaculations (so beginning human speech), and then, following natural observation, the world was ordered in consonance with the gods. As Hock well says about the early gods of Greece “...these gods were not felt by the Greeks to have been manufactured or invented as the ‘Personification’ implies; they were discovered and recognized, precisely as the modern scientist discovers and recognizes the effects of something that he calls ‘electricity.’”

Furthermore, the apparitions of nature are anthropomorphized insofar as they seem purposeful and humanlike. The human, responding to a vast range of stimuli in time and space, entranced by the sky as well as the abyss, infiltrating his spirit into this vast world, is both psychologically and materially affected by them. It is practically impossible, for any length of time, to take the apparitions of the world impersonally.

There is “every reason” to regard the fall of a meteor as a purposeful intervention in one’s life. It moves through the air like a flaming lance, sword, chariot, or torch held high. It is faster than a bird. It screams like a tiger. It strikes with the might of ten thousand men. As scientists say, “Everything must have a cause.” Well, here the cause is a superhuman thunderbolter. From effects, one reasons to causes.

If especially there are periods of time when great effects are common and men are shaken by them, the gods are implied, even visualized, as when a comet resembles different human figures and organs. Men measure the effect carefully, as the ancient Etruscans every spot struck by lightning, to see in the measure of a divine intervention the intent of the god.

In summation, the age becomes confirmed as religious. The more intense, pervasive, and frequent the experiences, the more religious the age becomes. It is as certain as any other

proposition of science, that, were an asteroid or comet of modest size to strike the globe, astronomy would promptly become astrology, meteorology divination, biology creationist, politics catastrophic, and theology revivalist. Evidence for this statement is strewn among all writings on the effects upon humans of close-in and crashing celestial bodies.

This divinity, perhaps the same, perhaps another, is known not only by celestial or other natural apparitions; it is also manifested in ways that will be demonstrated in chapter 3. The god is as prompt to appear as religion itself, inevitable in the primeval mind, as culture, too, is prompt to appear and as fast as it is instrumented, married into, if not born of, the sacred. We speak thus, of a hologenesis of *homo sapiens*, culture, religion, and gods.

Logically, the evolutionary theory of a slow final development of *homo* is gone; so is the theory of cultural evolution, of the evolution of religions, and of the progressive evolution of a concept of god. All of these things are today very much perceived, afforded and functioning as they did in the first centuries of humankind.

The science that those of us who write books so highly esteem represents a sharp break with the history of mankind, but scarcely less a break with the human thought and behavior of today. We can, and shall, make much of it, but should remember all the while that the proportion of science to religion in human behavior is like the ratio of the depth of the surface crust of the Earth to the radius of the whole globe, one to four hundred. And as the thickness of the crust varies beneath oceans and continents, so does the depth of penetration of the scientific method vary in different cultures and minds.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SUCCESSION OF GODS

The first god who was, remains in the latest god who is. The gods have been of the same descent, always, everywhere. I mean this not in the sense of many theologians, that, "Yes, God has been eternally Himself but we have gradually learned more about His nature," nor in the sense of many sectarians that, "Yes, people have forever worshiped false gods but gradually we are coming to see my God," but rather I mean it to say that the gods were discovered once, in the earliest times, and that there had been a direct descent of the same divinities down to the present. By "discovered" is meant that the first humans perceived gods in the world; they perceived the supernatural, and they took immediate steps to control it.

Such statements may provoke panic in various intellectual quarters, and we wonder whether to arrest the panic or let the room be cleared. Much of our religious thinking depends upon refusing or denying the statements. Even some hard-boiled anthropologists meekly purchase meliorism in religious history, part of the famous idea of evolutionary progress, some such belief as that by indistinguishable degrees, dull-witted savages become plant-worshippers, and these grow into deists, who later become monotheists and finally begin to be secularists - and anthropologists. Even those who do not believe in gods are quite sure that they are competent to distinguish good gods from bad ones.

Yet the history of religion permits the statement. Leroi-Gourhan believes that the Upper Paleolithic hunters were probably religious. I have supported this view in *Chaos and Creation* with illustrations of a probable mating of Heaven as a bison and Earth in the form of a woman. Much earlier practices respecting

burials and the mounting of bear skull accord to Neanderthal man also basic religious ideas. Leroi-Gourhan (in *Religions de la Préhistoire*) produces a scenario of a large primordial religion from an “insignificant” incised tablet. What is revealed by relics must be only a token of full-scale rites of religion.

A recent Soviet excavation finds religious incisions on animal skulls hundreds of thousands of years ago; for that matter, Pietro Gaietto attributes sculptures to “hominids” of 1.5 million years of age; but, as I have argued in other works, the measurement of time is a sorry state of disrepair. In *Homo Schizo I*, incidental to establishing the hologenesis of culture, a connection of symbols and the supernatural is made. In my general attempt there and elsewhere to shorten drastically the time of *homo sapiens* and to identify to erase the need to account for a long period of stupid human development prior to a mutation, or natural selection, or social invention that would initiate religion, along with man.

Further, I am in accord with the claim of anthropologists Washburn and Moore, that mankind could have originated only once. It seems to me that humanity is so distinctive in its self-awareness and symbolism, and that these traits are so suffusive over the scope of human behavior, that, once human in these regards, thence human in all regards.

Paul Radin (*Primitive Religion*) argues against the belief, represented especially by Andrew Lang, Pinard de la Boullaye, and others, that the primordial religion contained a belief in a Supreme God or High God. Rather, “wherever a Supreme Deity or a High God... exists it is the belief either of a few individuals or of a special group.” He is persuaded that ordinary people are bereft of sky religion, a thesis that is patently false and can only be precipitated out of the materialistic brew of early Marxist anthropology.

Our interest is not to enter this debate but to veer towards a more important truth. Earliest humans gave preeminence to sky gods, as soon as one or more might be discerned through the thinning canopy of clouds. Ouranos and his counterparts in

other cultures were, as we have remarked, first Heaven, then God, corresponding to the canopy and the appearance of a great sun-like object (among many others) in the new skies. However, since we believe this tumultuous set of natural events took a part in creating the human race itself, we would maintain that man was never human before he was religious.

Some tribes appear to follow spiritualism and animism and lack astral heavenly gods of human quality. We find ancestral spirits and ghosts usually inhabiting territories and, if they are disembodied, lower parts of the atmosphere; or the atmosphere is a medium through which they may move more easily than by treading the earth. Indeed, was not the vault of heaven itself low? And was not the Earth the goddess, sufficient itself to the first age of religious awareness? The Clouds of Heaven were many and low, until descended in deluges.

The Vault of Heaven was lifted and humans saw the heavenly bodies removing themselves to remoteness and, too, the gods and hosts of heaven behaving destructively and benevolently with their own wills and human features.

We can agree with Mircea Eliade (*The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion*) Where, discussing Wilhelm Schmidt (*Ursprung der Gottesidee*) he says,

“It is true that the belief in High Gods Seems to characterize the oldest cultures, but we also find there other religious elements. As far as we can reconstruct the remote past, it is safer to assume that religious life was from the very beginning rather complex, and that ‘elevated’ ideas coexisted with ‘lower’ forms of worship and belief.”

Thus, a prominent, although not dominant school of thought in the history of religion, exemplified in the work of A. Lang, M. Muller, R. Pettazoni, W. Schmitt, and M. Eliade propounds the thesis that the first worshiper and hence the ancestors of all religions believed in sky-gods. We find their arguments persuasive and add to them what we know about actual prehistoric skies and catastrophic occurrences affecting the skies.

The belief in sky-gods is attested to both by the most ancient sources of religious practice and by the studies of modern so-called primitive peoples (whom we prefer to call “tribal”). All of the “great” religions begin their stories in the skies: The Judaic complex, the Greco-Roman complex, the Egyptian, the old Chinese religion of Heaven, the Meso-American complex, the Teutonic, the Persian, the Hindu. “The Chinese T’ien means at once the sky and the god of the sky.” Among the less familiar religions, the Mongol, the Sumerian, the Babylonian, the Celtic, the Baltic, and the Slavic have nominated the sky and its god(s) for preeminence. Not only this; so far as one can tell, all primitive religions have important celestial referents, and we may quote cases from Eliade again:

“The supreme divinity of the Maori is named Iho; *iho* means elevated, high up. Uvuwu, the supreme god of the Akposo Negroes, signifies what is on high, the upper regions. Among the Selk’nam of Tierra del Fuego God is called Dweller in the Sky or He Who is in the Sky. Puluga, the supreme being of the Andaman Islanders, dwells in the sky... The Sky God of the Yoruba of the Slave Coast is named Olorun, literally Owner of the Sky.

The Samoyad worship Num, a god who dwells in the highest sky and whose name means sky. Among the Koryak, the supreme divinity is called the One on High, the Master of the High, He Who Exists. The Ainu know him as the Divine Chief of the Sky, the Sky God, the Divine Creator of the Worlds, but also as *Kamui*, that is, Sky. The list could be easily extended.”

Why is the sky the seat of the gods and even the gods themselves? From his unmatched scholarship, Eliade fetches a proposition which we believe to be incorrect: “Simple contemplation of the celestial vault already provokes a religious experience. The sky shows itself to be infinite, transcendent...For the sky, *by its own mode of being*, reveals transcendence, force, eternity. It *exists absolutely* because it is *high, infinite, powerful*.” This speculation which figures over several pages, stands without supporting evidence. It seems to say, “since heaven is divine, and the gods are celestial, there must be a reason; the reason is a) since the gods are there, the

sky must have impressed man and b) the sky is impressive (for the gods are there).” The logic is confusing and borrows, though not with conscious purpose, the propaganda technique of showering agreeable statements upon the reader.

“Indeed, if one shows (as has been done in recent decades) that the religious lives of the most primitive peoples are in fact complex, that they cannot be reduced to ‘animism,’ ‘totemism,’ or even ancestor-worship, that they include visions of Supreme Beings with all the powers of an hypotheses which deny the primitive any approach to ‘superior’ hierophanies are nullified.”

One must return to the beginning. Granting that the sky-gods and sky-religions are primordial, how is man prompted to perceive the supernatural there, place preeminent divine activities there, and make the sky the centerpiece of religion? If humans existed long before religion was invented, then it should be embarrassing to argue that the skies might exist for millions of years before the idea of religion popped into the minds of people everywhere (and very much the same idea of religion, that is, sky-religion without aeons of animism, pantheism, ghosts, totemism, and such other forms of religion).

Eliade does not explain how early religions would move from sky-gods to demonism, totemism and animism, and sometimes back, for modern tribes of this ilk meet no insuperable problem in adopting a sky religion such as Islam or Christianity. We offer two explanations. First, these religious practices were originally, have been, and are always with us, and are not at all embarrassed at co-existing with sky-gods.

The second explanation is consistent with the first. The sky-gods seem to have disappeared from many minds of our “high” civilization in favor of the worship of technology, cinema and political heroes, and a number of psychopathological quirks. “Primitive tribes,” since explorers and anthropologists began their profuse reports, seem to have lost their sky-gods, too, or never to have had any, or to possess *dei otiosi*. May not these tribe people be acting like these civilized people in focusing upon the sky-gods when the gods are active, or when the

memory of them, consciously or unconsciously, is acute, tending to dismiss, forget, and deny them when they are not causing great trouble? The skies became peaceful and the world stopped shaking; people turned to the supernatural manifestations of their closer environment. In this case, we may surmise also that the sterner the institutions of memory (records, graphics, priesthoods, bureaucratic churches, holidays) the longer the sky-gods will persist in a culture.

Faced with embarrassment, the idea of long evolution of religion (but then perhaps, too, of the long evolution of man) might be dropped. Then at least, we see man becoming human and sky-religious concurrently.

But another embarrassment occurs. If this occurs at one place and one time, as we have asserted, how do all people settle upon the sky and often the same creation stories of first generation gods, as we shall see? “Diffusion,” one might venture; from the first Adam and his home locale, there went forth the common focus and story (“Just as the Hebrew *Genesis* says!”?). If so, the first human must have achieved the diffusion; there would be no humans to pick up the story elsewhere.

In his book of *Timaeus*, Plato accepts and rationalizes in its early pages the existence of “everything visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moving with confusion and disorder” prior to the work of the *Divinity* of *demiurge* which in its plenitude of intelligence and power “reduced it from this wild inordination into order.”

Here is the first revolution; a Chaos, worked upon by a Demiurge (God) produces Order. This is a common ancient myth but we recall that *Timaeus* is a highly sophisticated Pythagorean and thinker. I conclude that the first of all great events remembered by man and emplaceable in primevalogy is the separation of Heaven from Earth.

The *Divinity*, according to Plato-*Timaeus*, using earth, fire, water, and air from the universe formed (generated) it into a

figure, an animal containing all figures and animals and gave it the 'most becoming'... "spherical shape, in which all the radii from the middle are equally distant from the bounding extremities." So says Taylor in his great commentary on Timaeus. This universe moves in a circular revolution.

Taylor concludes that the boundless, the universe before god was composed of thick cloud or mist to early and late Greek philosophers. Fire made it visible and that is why it became the first of the elements.

There is a major dilemma in Timaeus, faced by all philosophers and theologians who explain creation. Was God always around but disinclined to do anything about the Chaos? Then finally did he act and make order, i.e., the universe as man knows it?

My interpretation is as follows:

The Cosmologist is Man.

Man senses ancient experiences.

He asks *when* did experience begin.

In fact, he is asking "when did I begin?" i.e. my inquiring mind.

He thinks everything always was, because this is a logical thought.

He recollects, however, a time before the time he recalls, and remembers such time as chaos or disorder (or thick fog).

This time of the ordering of chaos must be either a memory of when man first got his head straight, i.e. could reason and ask basic questions, or an actual revolution of his nature or environment (a catastrophic set of events involving perhaps the lifting of a law canopy from Earth) which he recalls because he was already homo sapiens in all or part; but *he* cannot recall any *specific* catastrophic events before this time ; therefore it becomes his creation moment, his gestalt of creation.

Then there are later stories about divine and celestial behavior that are found throughout the world, as, for example, the later

coming of an electric or thunderbolting god. For instance, Eliade comments, as have I, on “the later transformations of sky gods into storm gods.” Is this diffusion, or a common experience of separated people? Evidently, religious historians do not sense that a sequence of gods might exist, which are related to real natural events as experienced by widely separated people, such events being originally involved in the selection of the sky as the first god and the home site of the gods.

Religion begins and endures in the sky, and the gods with it, because the sky has been much more than the sky that we experience today. The oldest religions and tribal legends agree generally that the skies were a heavy and full covering of the Earth, that they become turbulent, descending upon the Earth, that they broke and discharged liquids and solids upon the world, that before man’s eyes the god of the sky took shape, and that here was the first or Ouranian religion.

The primordial heaven and god do not endure forever. And at this point, Eliade recalls the famous ancient concept of the *deus otiosus*, the distant, removed, hence disoccupied god. Having created the world the first gods generally retire. “Celestially structured supreme beings tend to disappear from the practice of religion, from cult; they depart from among men, withdraw to the sky, and become remote, inactive gods(*dei otiosi*);” Eliade presents relevant cases. “Everywhere in these primitive religions the celestial supreme being appears to have lost *religious currency*. . . Yet he is remembered and entreated as the last resort. . .” A quantumvolutionary would surmise that the tribal (‘primitive’) response to a long period of settled skies is exactly like the civilized society’s response: to forget in part the great gods of disastrous ages, to secularize, to reduce religion to superstition, and also to make the Sun a catch-all for the gods.

But once again Eliade resorts to reductionist explanation and writes such lines as, “The divine remoteness actually expresses man’s increasing interest in his own religious, cultural, and economic discoveries.” He illustrates the “remoteness” by cases where in good times, gods are ignored, only to be appealed to in

desperate times. This is a very different remoteness. In the celestial archetype, god is remote because he is not around and operative; in the second case, god is present but neglected.

Eliade does not bring out the most striking fact about the retired god. His is often a forced retirement, following a bloody, world-shaking revolution. The Greek Ouranos was castrated by his son Kronos in a terrible revolt, and moved into exile, with no intimations of a return to power. A new great age begins.

The birth of the great goddess Athena is reported in the Homeric “Hymn to Athene.”

“Athene sprang quickly from the immortal head and stood before Zeus who holds the aegis, shaking a sharp spear: great Olympus began to reel horribly at the might of the bright-eyed goddess, and earth round about cried fearfully, and the sea was moved and tossed with dark waves, while foam burst forth suddenly: the bright son of Hyperion stopped his swift-footed horses a long while, until the maiden Pallas Athene had stripped the heavenly armor from her immortal shoulders.”

Moreover, the new great gods are also celestial. They are not household familiars, woods sprites, or volcano ghosts. The Greek pantheon is well-known, but there are others as well. All of the great Greek gods are sky gods, though they may keep house on Earth as well, Hephaistos on Lemnos, Hades in the nether regions, and so on. The great ones are identified with the moon and planets: Aphrodite, Kronos, Zeus, Hermes, Athena, Ares, and possibly Apollo, Uranus, and Poseidon. (We do not refer, of course, to contemporary nomenclature.) When these gods are entered upon the historical record, dim though this time be, a period of greatest power can be assigned to each; this project was undertaken in *Chaos and Creation*. Then the sequence goes: Ouranos, Aphrodite as Moon, Kronos, Zeus (Hera), Apollo, Hermes, Athene and Hephaistos as Venus, and Ares. And there is substantial reason (not commonsensical) that these gods achieved power, fame, and worship because they were identified with great sky bodies, such as the planets, upon the occasion of great natural catastrophes be falling the Earth.

Scanning Samuel Kramer's collection of *Mythologies* of the Ancient World, we find persistent outcroppings of the procession of gods and ages despite his complete disregard of events in the heavens that might differ from the behavior of the sun, moon, planets, comets, and stars today. We find dual splitting creation gods, of the type of Earth and Ouranos; we identify Saturn, Zeus, Venus, and Mars, and also stories of cataclysms of the raising of the sky, and of world ages.

In the *Epinomis*, Plato is accomplishing a significant trick of theology. Complaining of the mythology that places the gods on Mount Olympus, he replaces them upon the planets where, he says, they belong, hoping to reform their bawdy characters thereby. He says we must get rid of any notion of the strife of the gods. They move always in order. (Elsewhere, Plato would have any disbelievers in orderly skies punishable.) The astral gods are the real ones, he insists, and gives them their names. (He anthropomorphizes the vault of Heaven, Kosmos.) Their names, he suggests, should be coordinated with Syrian and Egyptian observations, which are much older and "tested by vast periods of time." To us it occurs that bringing the gods down to Olympus was psychologically an effort on the part of Greek myth-makers to control the gods; they became human and tied to human fortunes directly. Now Plato, feeling no threat of planetary disorders, wants to send them back to their former homes, which are once again safe. *De otiosi*, the removed gods, will be doubly safe, safe for themselves and safe for mankind.

We note that the Greek and many other cultures regard their sky gods as blood-related. To the Greeks - to us, for that matter - this could only mean that their history was intertwined, overlapping, of the same order of celestial experiences.

We note further that the greatest Greek philosophers and scientists did not argue against the succession of gods. They did not challenge the succession because somehow it was real to them. Somehow they were experientially or psychologically inhibited from claiming that the gods were born together. And so it was with other great ancient mythologies.

Eliade hardly pries into the secrets of the Hebrew gods; yet, guided by the hypothesis that gods occur in succession, and lend their new traits to religion it is not difficult to see in the Bible and the legends of the Jews a series of gods, not badly matched with the Greek and Mesopotamian gods. These were objects of worship by hostile factions. At the least monotheism becomes, if not polytheism, then serial polytheism. Thus, in the opening passages of *Genesis*, the figures of Ouranos and Kronos are vaguely discernible, occurring in turn, whereupon intimations of worship of the Moon, Jupiter, Hermes, and Baal-Venus intrude. The Archangel Gabriel, through Jewish legend, can be linked to the planet Mars, and the destruction of the Assyrian army of Sennacherib in 687 B.C. Yahweh, who is linked to Elohim (Saturn-Kronos) by Mosaic fiat, seems to be a Zeus-Horus-Jupiter figure to most scholars, and seems also to be a Thoth-Hermes-Mercury figure, blended with the Zeus figure, to the present writer (see *God's Fire: Moses and the Management of Exodus*). This latter god(s) can be fitted into history at the beginning of the Old Bronze Age in Egypt and the Near East.

Thus, there has been a succession of gods and goddesses in human history. Yet human nature is obsessive, that is, faithful; further, it was a great sacrilege to forget god, and severe punishment and expiation not only followed forgetting but were performed as prophylaxis. The compelling reason to change gods is to be found in reality. The reality is that the gods have changed, and, despite all his efforts to be loyal, man has been forced to worship new gods over the ages.

The ambivalence of the gods caused mankind from the beginning to exert itself strenuously to control them. A continuous redefinition occurred. Yet never has the nuclear complex of a god been put aside without great external pressures, the most excruciating of which has been the advent of an apparently more flexible and potent deity. In these cases, people have, as often as they could, tried to merge the new and the old; any evidence of continuity and any confusion of identities, whether physically or psychologically produced,

have been seized upon to establish that the worship of the new is faithful to the worship of the old.

Therefore it happens, consciously or not, that all gods have an unbroken line of ancestors going back to primordial chaos; there the gods are made from the abstract elements such as air and water or the world begins out of nothing. We should bear in mind that when Egyptian history opened, with the Pyramid texts, Osiris(Saturn) was already dead, *deus otiosus*, and Horus (Zeus) reigned. Thus too, recorded history and ruins of civilized settlements portray the Saturnian (Osirian) “Golden Age” and its horrendous destruction.

The god Nun of Egypt, first god of the first recorded cosmogony, bears in his hieroglyphic name that he is of the primordial wastes of water in the sky, and Egyptian legends state this to be the case. Mother Earth, *Terra Mater*, the Universal Genitrix, Gaia, is the most durable of the gods, and found practically everywhere. In Hesiod’s *Theogony*, she gives birth to Ouranos who is “a being equal to herself, able to cover her completely.” It is clear, however, that Earth (who may even be conceived of as masculine sometimes) reacts to the changing gods of change. This Nun or heaven is “father of the gods” and father of Atum or Re. He or it is the demiurge of the boundless, featureless darkness, from which evolved the first hills or eminences. There appeared in early Egypt four different cult centers with special creation myths, all of which were essentially the same.

In Sumer in the 5th millennium before the present, as legend has it Nammu, whose ideogram carries the meaning of “sea,” was called the mother of heaven and earth who also bore the gods. Fluids and gases are favored elements of chaos and materials of creation. There is more than a semblance of logic alone in this accord of legends; the idea that gases go with chaos is attractive but is more than *ex post facto* explaining of legendary fiction. Fluids and gases must indeed have enveloped primordial man and attended the birth of the gods. Ouranos emerged out of the watery and turbulent wastes of the sky cloaked in robes of clouds. Philo Byblius anciently reported

from earlier sources that the first Phoenician god was Eilium or Hypsistos (“the Highest”) and was succeeded by Ouranos who was succeeded by El or Kronos. But I would interpret this primordial god as the first stage of Ouranos, the adamantine condition of the sky prior to its breaking open to reveal the great light of Ouranos.

The Babylonians, successors to Sumer, in the early third millennium B.C. worshiped Marduk-Bel (Baal) as patron god and world creator, exalted over the old Mesopotamian pantheon just as Jupiter came to be exalted over Saturn in the Roman-Greek pantheon. Poseidon (brother of Zeus and son of Chronos) remained in heaven after his father fell and only later, upon agreement with Zeus, descended to rule the seas. He also flooded the land as he did so and was known as the land-encroacher. Thus the descent of Poseidon (Neptune) is to be identified with a great deluge, perhaps a name for, it not a later part of, the same great deluge that is connected with the crippling and binding of Kronos (Saturn) and is the same as the flood of Noah brought down by Elohim in Hebrew Genesis.

The qualities of new gods were thus to replace, overlap, and add to the qualities of the old; theology assisted by political power and the manifest abilities of the new god performed the task. Jupiter, for example, was called “fecundator,” but the original fertilizer of the Earth and founder of agriculture was his father, “Saturn fecundator.” The process by which the Sun usurped the identity and history of the old gods over the past two thousand years is homologous; when the skies settled down, this great and apparent sky-body grew in religious stature.

Buddhism climbed upon Hinduism; Confucianism and Taoism evolved from the worship of T’ien. The Christians and Muslim supplied “new testaments” to the Hebrew “Old Testament.” There are no “Great Religions” in the world whose occurrence cannot be contemporaneously connected with natural events of the caliber of world-wide catastrophe. The same applies to small but persistent, durable religions such as modern Judaism, and Parsiism, descended from Persian Mazdaism through

Zoroaster. I do not speak of many other religions of the world, some of which may well be “superior” or more deserving of the title “great” by such criteria as may be advanced in discussion. Nor do I distinguish among sects within the “Great Religions,” while recognizing that in reality there may exist distinctions as significant, say, among Christian groups as between the “average” Christian religion and other religions. We hear of many instances in which Christians or Muslims are more comfortable among “head-hunting” sects or gnostic or totemistic religion than among their own kind.

An important line of attack may be leveled against our assertion that the succession of gods reflects a series of natural catastrophes upon Earth. Religions have continued to acquire new gods without actual catastrophes and have spread widely without catastrophes to help them do so. Some of these religions have been militarily aggressive, others peaceful. Thus Islam conquered large areas at first by the sword, as is well known, but in recent years has converted peoples readily with little bloodshed and compulsion, as in central Africa. Far back in time, as Wheatley (*The Pivot of the Four Quarters*) asserts, the Hindu pantheon moved into Southeast Asia along with its social institutions. Along with the religion went peaceful commerce. Many shrines were erected, around which there grew up cities. So enthusiastic were people for the peacefully inculcated religion that sometimes the near totality of a state’s economy was given over to oblations to the pantheon.

The 2600 years since the probable last great natural catastrophes have not been distinguished by peacefulness. War and slaughter have been conducted in the name of a warlike religion (or interpretation thereof), or of a peaceful religion, or in the name of no religion but the state or tribe. We are led, then, to conjecture that *homo sapiens* himself, though relieved of direct models of destructive behavior in the skies, continues to carry out deeply rooted impulses to destruction, whether through unconscious memory or because he is constructed genetically to do so. That both are in fact the case is a main thesis of my volumes *on Homo Schizo*.

So long as the skies were disturbed, and the Earth with it, the character of religion reflected clearly natural events and imposed models of conduct upon man. But religion itself was born in the creation of man and, if he were other than true to his nature or were of another nature, he would not have a peaceful religion and behave peacefully in all probability. Religion is a dependent variable of human nature. It is a dependent variable of natural events. We shall have to inquire, as we proceed, whether, in some other sense, in another kind of reality, religion may be an independent variable, owing its existence to conditions freed of human nature and ancient natural disasters.

To speak of religion as a variable reminds us of how vague and intangible are the materials of the history of religion and even of religious behavior today. We must toy with notions of impractical super-surveys, in frustration over this situation.

To speak properly about the religion of a person, a standard intensive interview at the least is required. "What precisely are your perceptions of the supernatural?" "What practices, life-pattern, or habits do you possess that are related to these perceptions?"

Then, of course, inasmuch as one's behavior is never quite aligned with one's professed beliefs and behavior, one should bring in some external objective testimony to supplement the interview. We should have hundreds of pages per person, but only from these would we be able to define operationally the person's religion.

Were all the people on Earth thus interviewed, and the results properly classified, tabulated, and analyzed, we should be able better to generalize about the relation of present religion and gods to the historical religions and gods - provided, we should add, that we have assembled and ordered all that might be known about historical religions back to their origins in the origins of man; this, however, we should probably be incapable of doing unless we were to adopt as the guiding hypotheses those already suggested in these first chapters: namely:

The earliest human cultures were simultaneously religious.

The earliest and most important supernatural objects everywhere were celestial.

The Ouranian complex of Heaven and Gods was the first list of *Dramatis Personae* of religion everywhere.

The Ouranian complex was overthrown by nature and simultaneously by man.

All successive gods everywhere have descended from and relate to the Ouranian complex.

Man believed himself forced to change gods from time to time by evidence in nature.

Man, as he changed gods, accomplished the transition with as few variations as possible in previously assigned powers, traits, names, vestments, rites and religious conceptions.

In these transitions, man became adept (to his way of thinking, which was and is delusory) at reconciling and controlling his gods through his religion, whence, by controlling the gods, at controlling the world, all with the ultimate and impossible goal of obtaining self-control and peace of mind.

CHAPTER THREE

KNOWING THE GODS

The collected qualities of gods resemble a bazaar where all types of potentially useful objects, frequently queer, are brought in by all sorts of people. The childish, outlandish and genial effects of the human mind are displayed in seller and buyer alike.

What brings one to the market: curiosity? hope of a rare beautiful utensil that one can afford? something to lighten our spirits? the euphoria of the busy scene? a thing - we know not what - that may change one's life? So one shops for gods. Some say, they are in everything. Some say, you cannot find what don't exist. Some say, they are most useful. Others say, they are not to be found when you need them.

If it were not for the fact that two billion people claim to know one or another god, perhaps we should scarcely bother to take up the question of what is known in this regard. Further, since most believers claim that their god wishes to be adored, and is infinitely capacitated, should not the god display himself clearly and prove at least his own existence, if not his other qualities, beyond a shadow of a doubt? But he avoids the flea market. He seems to want privacy, but then he should certainly resent the continuous universal efforts to bribe him to appear.

A few hardy souls venture to say that gods have little interest in humans and therefore have no motive to prove themselves. Some, like the deists, argue that the gods created everything and set it into motion; then, retiring, the gods left the world to develop by itself. Some merely say: "God works in mysterious ways his wonders to perform." (There is, incidentally, a religious adage for every circumstance.) Most who believe in

gods - these are in numbers largely of the Hebraic complex or Hinduism - prove their case by pointing to divine signs (hierophanies), including the marvelously intricate reality of the world, by asserting there must be a purpose to everything, and by commanding, "Don't ask questions; have faith."

Gods appear directly to people, especially to heroes, on occasion; if not the gods themselves, then surrogates or messengers reveal themselves, if not these, then hierophanies or manifestations of gods occur. Dozens of gods, thousands of agents and subordinate gods, and tens of thousands of hierophanies, performing in plural appearances, would, if catalogued, constitute millions of appearances. Zeus knew many women; Athena marched before many soldiers; Buddha came from a noble family; Jesus was known among the people as a man; Paul met him on the Road to Damascus, resurrected; children of Fatima conversed with Mary, Mother of Jesus.

Millions of such encounters have gone unreported because of the modesty of people; they could not believe their good luck. In Some religious sects, it is expected that now, if not earlier or later, every member must experience at the least a significant hierophany and a changed life thereafter.

A divine appearance or hierophany must be social, not individual, in the sense that it must be authenticated by the belief of others. This has not prevented millions of individuals, at some risk of persecution, whether criminal or medical, from claiming encounters.

Who validates encounters? This is properly a subject for the political science of religion. Who "should" validate them is the claim of as many theistic religions as exist. A large bureaucratic church may devote much energy to acknowledge any encounters, sometimes saying that god does not conduct himself so, so that he did once but now does not.

All sects lay down (that is, their gods lay down) rules for encounters. It is unthinkable that a Christian could conceive of his god going about raping women as Zeus was inclined to do.

On the other hand, Yahweh, the god of Moses, delighted in the killing of enemies both foreign and domestic; at least so says Moses in numerous cases, as when the heresy of the Golden Calf is discovered, and the Lord's order is "slay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbor." Three thousand Israelites were killed that day.

In the Hebraic complex, Moses is the central figure. "Moses spoke with God." These conversations have been subjected to analysis for thousands of years and it is unlikely that late psychiatric explanations such as have been offered by Julian Jaynes and the present author will be final. Be that as it may, the relationship of Moses and Yahweh can be analyzed within the framework and propositions of the psychology of hallucinations and delusions. That is, Moses was conducting interior psychological operations. Yahweh was, to his mind, a real sacred Lord God.

By treating the world around him - the Egyptians, the Israelites, the desert, the architecture of sacred enclosures, the bushes, rocks and waters, and his disciples as if they too were under the direction of Yahweh, Moses created a marvelously integrated religious complex recomposing this world and himself in the midst of great natural turbulence. The more one studies the Books of Moses, the more sense one can make of them as literal history written by a deluded and masterful genius. But this hardly advances the cause of the Hebraic religions.

Increasingly, psychiatry and physics are pressing upon religions to surrender all cases of alleged hierophanies. The majority are easy to prove false. But, as we shall see later on, science is "getting too smart for its own good," and beginning itself to present important arguments concerning the supernatural - its own hierophanies perhaps.

Certain types of ancient hierophanies lend themselves to scientific reinterpretation. Examples are the collectively witnessed catastrophes of great magnitude - such as the Deluge of Noah - and electrical discharges of types no longer experienced, such as were central to, the operations of Moses' Ark and the

Delphic Oracle. Whereas new evidence and scientific interpretation go to prove the veracity of ancient reports, the super natural character of the reports is thrown into doubt. Thus, a substantial proportion of the appearances of Yahweh in the *Book of Moses* occur in connection with (literally “on”) the Ark of Moses; most probably these were electrical displays, ingeniously managed, and believed to represent the fiery essence of the deity.

Deluge legends are worldwide. Survivors included not only Noah’s family but, to believe their legends, other people in different places on Earth. Evidence of large-scale flooding, totally beyond present experience, is worldwide. The cause, focusing now only upon the floods contemporary with Noah, were exoterrestrial and the water was in large part new water from outer space most likely from a nova of a theretofore much larger Saturn. The establishment of this theory, even if it is accepted as the second most likely alternative to “no worldwide flood at all,” reduces the religious and hierophanic aspects of the Hebrew story (and of all other religious descriptions).

Those who before saw the direct intervention of an explaining, instructing, humanly motivated god in the deluges gain a minor victory from the validation of sacred scriptures, but suffer a defeat of the notion of a divinely chosen people working under the immediate personal direction of their god. Dozens of peoples, perhaps all of them, inherit the belief that the gods once saved only them from a worldwide ruin. Doubt is cast upon all ethnocentric religious aspects of the Deluge, whence some persons will be led to a “higher religious synthesis” of the relations between gods and the natural world, while others will be led out of religion entirely.

Many people believe that they know gods by their effects, not by the grand effects of nature but by targeted effects upon issues of personal concern. The word “god” in Aryan etymology stems from the words “to sacrifice” and “to invoke.” Invocation, prayer, and rituals are seen to be followed by events unexplainable except by a direct divine intervention. A sick child is for example, the object of medical therapy and religious

solicitations; a cure is accredited to the divine; a failure of cure may be deemed to be in part a punishment, or the result of unconvincing solicitations. Seeking divine attention and determining whether and how it was provided take altogether too many forms, most of them well-known, to consider them at length here. The scientist will say “Explain all effects by natural causes; those not precisely determinable must be natural as well; where psychological effects are produced, these too are natural; for the human mind and its morale can be significant producers of effects in the context of human activity.”

Modern theologians and religious practitioners tend to transmogrify all forms of knowing about gods that seem vulnerable to the lances of science. Most theology has been apology for vulgar religion. Realizing, for instance, that mental asylums are well populated by hallucinators, they are most approving of more subtle religious encounters. Encounters are favored that do not implicate divine personages or voices or external visions but which display simple faith, spiritual resources, and the Lord secondhand. Thus, “I have faith in a benign Intelligence. It enables me to draw upon deep spiritual resources. I feel like Jeremiah, when the Lord told him ‘Behold, I have put my words in your mouth.’” The problem of hallucination ceases as soon as one uses indirect quotation, “I think that god would help me to defeat the enemies of our country.” This technique works all the better because in a bureaucratized society it has become rather insane for any job-holder to say “I” do this or that, rather than “We” or “our policy” or “the management” or “they.”

It is not an accident that the most strongly individualistic and anti-bureaucratic groupings of modern America overlap largely the religious sects with the greatest expectancy of personal encounters with their god. (This, incidentally, may explain the “mystery” to many people of how the suave Hollywood product Ronald Reagan came to be allied with the simple direct primitive evangelical Christians; he was a “rugged individualist,” anti-bureaucratic.)

The belief in gods arising from “faith” is a step away from personal encounters and authoritative testimonials. “Faith” is an affirmation. As such it is taboo in logic, for logic is grounded upon reasons and proofs. Logic would not exist if faith had its way. Faith cannot be proven, but it can never be driven from its deep psychological recesses; it can only be surrendered. What is reported by a triumphant rationalism as the “destruction” of faith must always remain the dubious word of a third party. If the believer resists the terms of surrender, faith will never be conquered.

Faith cannot prove itself by logic, but it can be justified by its effects. “See how happy is the person who believes. If you would be happy, believe!” If the faithful receive more than the usual share of what are regarded as the goods of life, their faith acquires a pragmatic proof, different from and inaccessible to empirical proof. Insofar as “the goods of life” are psychic and exoterrestrial, one can construct an infallible circle from which the non-faithful are excluded. One can come from heaven, live bathed in heavenly light, and return to heaven, invulnerable to mundane contradiction.

Let one step for a moment out of the charmed circle into competition for mundane “goods of life” and one finds oneself amidst a crowd of the variously successful where statistics come into play, and one can no longer be sure that faith is associated with achievement. “God must love the poor; he made so many of them,” it is said. Moreover, if the “goods” are doubted and “faith” as a good is committed to definition, debate and proof by conduct, then evil is the lot and behavior of many of the “real” faithful. “Faith moves mountains,” says the Gospel of Mark (II: 22-4), but faith in whom, and to where are the mountains moved?

“Faith, hope, and charity,” are supplicated by Paul the Apostle, but faith in its uttermost recess may be another word for the strong and unquenchable hope of a divine existence. Scientific psychologists will agree; faith is an attitude established by, preserved by, or destroyed by all that makes, maintains, and breaks other attitudes and predispositions: as for instance,

drinking and smoking, quarreling, charitability, studiousness, political party affiliations, etc. All this is what concerns a college course in developmental psychology: the workings of indulgences and deprivations of infancy, family life, and society systematically and authoritatively explained. Faith is educated as a pattern of expectations, endorsed and rewarded, such that the faithful one, under normal conditions, will never regret his course of life nor lose his expectations.

Besieged and buffeted in its last traditional trenches by modern science, faith nevertheless survives, because nothing else survives better, because the desperate refugees from science and reason crowd in with it, and because a variety of non-traditional licenses are granted to privateers who venture to vest their faith in ancient astronauts, flying saucers, and the like.

Philosophical arguments for the existence of the divine can scarcely capture the popular imagination and suffuse popular religion with practical implications and a precise operative morality. A mention of the traditional arguments for the existence of god may illuminate the problem.

There is first the argument of the necessary reality of perfection: if we can conceive of the idea of a perfect being, the being must exist, because existence is an aspect of perfection. We join most philosophers in refusing this argument. A great deal of nonsense exists in the human mind, product of its inner machinations; must it all be granted the status of reality somewhere, sometime, someplace? All the monsters of fairy tales and science fiction would come alive. Dante's *Inferno* would be awaiting its newest victims even now.

Most conceivable things do not exist. Nor can we make them exist by an act of will, by the mechanism that has been called "omnipotence of thought," although we can make them exist as operative forces in people's minds, as illusions. Furthermore, we know that people lie in part according to their illusions, in all areas of existence - politics, love, economics, beauty, etc. Illusions have consequences. Hence if the consequences of a belief in a being of specific absolute perfection are good, or at

least better than the consequences of any substitutable illusion, we may seek earnestly to establish and maintain the illusion, or myth (for that is what it is as well.)

A second traditional argument for the existence of god pleads that the world as we see it cannot have come about without a previously existing cause. Since the universe is so grand and so complex, containing by definition everything, its cause must be at least as great, conforming to what may be called god, the demiurge, the first cause, the creator. Everything does have a precedent form - call it a sense. This we sense; and every experiment can probably prove it.

But it may be of the nature of the world to extend itself indefinitely in an infinity of forms occupying time and space or a presently unimaginable dimension. Hence the gods as creators are unnecessary. One may slide into a counter-assertion to prove their existence: that the gods are in the principle of change, there being no ultimate reason for change other than the will of a demiurge, who may be Aristotle's "unmoved mover," or Heraclitus' inherent changefulness of all things. So close are such abstractions to scientific generalities, so far removed from practical religion, and so vulnerable to contradiction (for all things can be viewed in their unchanging aspects a la Parmenides), that the gods would soon shuffle off to Sheol with their help.

The most popular of arguments for the existence of gods is the (humanly perceived) design of the world. So marvelous are the construction and interconnections of things and so purposeful (that is, moving towards their proper goals) that an infinitely masterful designer must have created the universe. However, even before modern science exposed some of the guts of the material world, including the physiology of psychology, philosophers, priest, and ordinary people were acutely aware of the evils of the world. They were aware that the world had been nearly destroyed on occasion by natural (divine) forces, so that the gods came to represent destructiveness as well as constructiveness.

Under such conditions, the problem of evil was tied into the grand design, so that interminable arguments might occur concerning what parts of the world and its people were deliberately designed by the gods to malfunction. The tedium of this discussion hardly assists in any proof of divine design, while the issue keeps people in a prolonged and useless state of fear and quarrelsomeness.

To be sure, a great many processes of the world seem to be moving toward a definable end. Thus, the common astronomical theory is that the sun will ultimately burn itself out; so is the idea already cited that the present fragmented universe of starry bodies was created by a primordial explosion, but that a limit of expansion will be reached, whereupon the universe will implode. Again it is often said that man will colonize space, etc. All such processes appear to be non-random, hence to some thinkers, purposeful.

Take the biological “law” that evolution cannot reverse itself. If this is so, evolution appears to have some goal, which encourages certain theorists to feel better about the world and others to believe in gods. Materialists can take a different view: non-random processes develop an evermore specific direction out of inertia; once an ear begins to evolve in animals, it will develop into various ears unless it finally quantavolutes; the developing ear preempts some proportion of the changeability of the organism. Therefore, an “end” or “purpose” can be claimed. It is hardly an occasion for divine pride, or for pride in the divine. And sense organs may degenerate in evolution, not only among blind moles, but in man, whose senses are stunted by comparison with those of one or more species.

With an irresistible thrust, most theistic religions have promoted the idea that “nothing is impossible to the gods.” The gods are usually allowed perfection. They are eternal, omnipotent omniscient, omnipresent, omnivirtuous, unchanging and unchangeable (for how can perfection change?) So naive are such assignments of qualities, that they seem to be pure projected delusions. Just as one can solve a mathematical problem by manipulating the concept of infinity, one can

arrange and interpret any divine action with the concept of complete qualities.

It seems that design is found where the heart is: one who is healthy, reared to optimism, indulged, and promoted in life, is likely to find better designs in what he senses and experiences than others find who are less blessed. Indeed, a goodly part of much religion consists precisely in designating the world as evil, in anticipation of our arriving shortly after death in a better world, or escaping presently from the world about.

The stress of religions upon suffering is unavoidable. Suffering is not only blatant in ordinary lives; it is also regurgitated as feelings out of history, not merely church and social history, but the history of great disasters engineered by the gods. Finally, suffering gestates in the very genetics of humanity, in its eternal fearfulness, in the contradiction between wishing for everything and controlling nothing.

At times, religious factions diverge and sects spring up which preach a religion of secular joy and the elimination of suffering and sorrowful memory. But secular joy as religion soon liquidates the religion. The joy of religion generally must consist in the appreciation of man's lot and a surcease from it upon death, or resurrection, or otiose earthliness.

The philosopher Immanuel Kant perceived in the moral laws always present among human beings a proof of the existence of god. Unlike the beasts, men rule themselves by voluntary ethics, it is said. This unique and universal search for the good suggests a divine purpose. Only the magnificent order of the heavens, which moved Kant to "ever-increasing wonder and awe," was comparable to "the moral law within me."

Modern quantavolution readily demonstrates the inconsistency of the order of heavens. As contrasted with older generations of scientists, the younger generation sees more and more the history of the heavens as of quantavolutions and catastrophes. Ethology and socio-biology meanwhile are asserting vigorously the presence, now here and now there, in animals and plants, of

moral rules and moral behavior that man used to regard as products of his superior and voluntary ethics.

As for the “moral law of man,” sociologist Louis Wirth used to remark to his students that “people differ in every way that they can.” A thoroughly relativistic and pragmatic philosopher would add that it is “the moral law within me” which causes most of the worst human conflicts in this world. I agree with both men. The claim to know gods, so general in history and today, has not reduced differences so much as it has promoted fights over them.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE HEAVENLY HOST

The animation of nature is an instinctual interpretation, primordial with humankind. It occurs with humans today, more obviously among the young. To exorcize it takes training.

The earliest gods took shape as the Sky and Earth. There developed next a more definitely formed solar god of the Sky. A change in nature was responsible for the change in divine forms. Logically, and in accord with most evidence of what was manifest, the primordial welkin was densely packed, without brilliant separated lights, until the sky was broken up and these appeared. The great god would have come first in his solar (or planetary) form if the sky had been penetrable.

Until nearly 2700 years ago the skies were periodically invested with changing forms, and much of this turbulence was impacting upon the Earth physically, as well as upon the minds of humans. The scene was conducive to polytheism. Divine presences of all types might be discerned. Yet there was usually a great god, a father of gods, an Ouranos, a Kronos or a Zeus.

We infer from this fact that such beings were at some time most impressive features of the sky and, when they were not, were scalding memories, which had so dominated the human setting that no successor, no matter how prominently active could match what its “ancestor” or “father” had achieved.

Some cultures, such as the Roman, Greek, and Hindu, did not conceal the succession of fathers, and assigned family roles to junior actors, while the Hebrews over a period of time accepted the Mosaic rationalization which fitted several great gods into a unity. This did not come without ideological and political strug-

gles of great intensity and long duration, some of which are recounted, in expurgated form, in the Old Testament.

“Varro had the diligence to collect thirty thousand names of gods - for the Greeks counted that many. These were related to as many needs of the physical, moral, economic, or civil life of the earliest times.” He found 40 Hercules alone. So writes G. Vico. The sacred book of the *Mahàbàrata* (1: 39) claims 33,333 Hindu deities, and later sources say that there were a thousand times as many. The Nordic *Grimnismal* gives over 50 names to Odin. The Babylonian *Emunia Elis* culminates in a recital of 50 names of Marduk. In the history of symbolism and language, words may actually have begun as god-names. Words might have been more sacred than pragmatic, until an advanced state of collective amnesia and sublimation had been achieved. Even today, a great many people cannot adapt to the idea that words are not real hard things.

If the Greeks had 30,000 god-names, and the Hindus even more, then all the world’s cultures must have had hundreds of thousands. The great numbers, however, reduces to a comprehensible order when a proper theory is applied to them. The total of this heavenly host includes, first, a few great gods, whose real existence in the sky lent structure to the ages. Second occur the thousands of names of the great gods, most of which have yet to be identified with their referents. Many of these names are concealed references; others are what foreign cultures call a certain culture’s gods; some names isolate a quality of the gods; some names are used to marry the gods of one culture to those of another.

The principle of ambivalence (in the form of opposites) leads to the division of great gods into gods and devils. Here the human mind seeks to control the gods by projection of benevolence and beneficence upon a good god, and malevolence and maleficence upon a bad god or devil, hoping that the one will outwit and outstruggle the other. Devils have invariably extruded from an animated religious setting, there being no way of exorcizing them from man’s primordially established soul. In the Hebraic

complex, god cannot commit evil; if a bad effect is deemed evilly inspired, it is attributed to the devil.

Some religions have merged the contradiction of good and evil into the same god, who holds different names for his given qualities and exercises benevolent or malevolent impulses for inscrutable reasons, or for “obvious” reasons, or for reasons not to be inquired about. The Greek gods were rather of this type. One significant result of the differences may be in the potential intensity of the “guilt complex.” The Greco-Roman pagans suffered less from guilt-feelings than their Christian counterparts. Such gods may acquire many appellations, some of them contradicting others. New appellations may also serve to avoid the designation of new gods, an ever-present “problem” in a polytheistic system.

Appellations may thus be congruent and complementary, that is, logical and harmonious qualities that a single personality may possess. Or they may appear nonconforming, leading nonparticipating observers (enemies or scientists) to question the nature of the god. However, as with great contradictions - “God vs. Devil” - so with lesser contradictions - “god of arts vs. god of war” - the contradiction might be only apparent, the same supernatural being having apparently produced a variety of effects during his primary effective manifestations in nature. Thus Mercury-Hermes is both thief and healer. And Santillana and von Dechend refer to “the baffling Mesopotamian texts dealing with gods cutting off each other’s necks and tearing out each other’s eyes.”

In the eternally agonizing search for a great god with whom one might co-exist peacefully, those who followed the path of opposites have been plagued by the possibly triumphant fearful powers of the devil, whereas those who pursued the path of the contradictions had to admit the mutability of their god and the impossibility of more than incessant recurrent reconciliations between god and people.

Another major source of divine names (besides the attributions) is the outcome of processes of memory and forgetting. To

forget the disasters that characterized the appearance of the gods was urgently demanded by the bruised mind; but any lapse of memory would be accompanied by fear that god will not permit himself to be forgotten and will punish forgetfulness. The mind then works to define and characterize god so that his image will be tolerable upon the conscious level. It further adds new words to its vocabulary of the divine, discovering that a god called by another name is less threatening. Still further, by the logic of delusion, a god whose name is mysterious or hidden will respect the awe and fear bound up in the secrecy and at the same time will restrict himself to activities that do not threaten the very core of terror that crouches in the human soul. A plethora of non-names, secret and cult-names, and common partial names comes forth.

Effects of many kinds are produced, the least of which is the confusion of names that confronts the outside observer; the selective remembering is tolerable; occult elites can dominate societies; the language and concepts of a people are enriched as the naming of gods flows through the symbolic world by association, analogy, and implication.

Although some thousands of names are those of great gods in one form or another, other thousands are assigned to angels, minor devils, minor divinities, spirits, divinized natural phenomena of the earth, air, water, fire, plants and animals, divine heroes, and divine heroes, and divine kings. This myriad of names also possesses its logic. Prior to human creation the names could not exist: there was not stimulus, impulse, or mechanisms. Once the mind had exploded into self-awareness, however, a great many beings might move into it.

Limits to the number of names were set by the “behavior” of such beings, there being more sub-gods in disastrous than in peaceful times. The need for alleviation of anxiety occasions a sort of subconscious shifting of cargo with an invention and appeal to a new god following the failure of performance of an old one. The logical operation or reduction of “beings” is useful, when, for purposes of control, fewer sub-gods are needed. Finally, the ability of the inventor to achieve collective

consensus may sometimes fail; no doubt heroic charisma or priestly office allows one to designate a new god only to a degree.

But, while these factors restrain the process, in any given culture the number of supernatural beings is apparently magnified by the telling of tales from foreign and destroyed cultures; these beings of course enter the mind only as subordinates or evil opposites of one's own gods. Moreover, as in classical Greek mythology, supernatural beings pile their traits and presence upon the true beings of the culture until, to the undiscerning mind, they become indistinguishable from the humans; the totality of divinities and spirits becomes a seemingly nonsensical mass.

By analogy with the cultures of modern tribes, and by reference to surviving cave drawings and artifacts, it would seem that people are naturally inclined to perceive gods in all aspects of nature. This perception is true insofar as the gods of creation must be assumed to be genetically behind every divine or spiritual (supernatural) communication, symbol, and image. It is also natural even among apes (The neuter gender, the "it," is itself probably a product of divinely inspired categorization; "it" is needed not for inanimate objects, as school children are told, but for a godly presence that is neither female nor male.)

The collective experience and interpersonal communication of an event that requires a naming - an event whose connection with the numerous high-energy expressions of nature is obvious but whose direct efficient cause is not a great god - is a final way by which many a demigod is produced.

Thus the breezes are named, the meteors, the volcanoes, the erratic boulders, the deeps of caves and seas, the ancient trees, the animals of curious form and expression, and so on to many thousands. Then, too, the early kings, the kings of crises, their mothers, the sorcerers, saints, inventors, prophets, and so on to many more thousands of the divine and semi-divine. Then, further, the products of their work: "devil's hole," "angel rock," "Mount Zeus," "Metora," and so on through a world whose

geography - that was once worked upon by the gods - belatedly and usually mistakenly accredits the heavenly host via a largely invented name. All of these processes of naming are consistent with and dependent upon the primordial appearances of the gods.

The saints of several Christian churches are a form of minor divinity, who are deemed to have performed celestial miracles, given great social services, communed with the Lord, or served gloriously in battle. Saint Joan of Arc comes readily to mind. Periods of natural and social crisis are their favored setting. The Hindus, who do not draw scholastic distinctions so fine, have created divinities of the same order. Thus the villages of West Bengal worship Sitala, Goddess of smallpox, though smallpox no longer troubles the area. R.W. Nicolas has found the origins of Sitala in the 18th century, upon an unprecedented outburst of the plague. Bengali doctors soon became preeminent in their analysis and treatment of smallpox, using variolation. Simultaneously, the disease was ascribed to Sitala, who had been born late among the gods and found none who knew how to worship her. So she chose to infect especially children with the pox, for “a late-coming goddess required such terrible weapons.” Hers became an annual and major rite, accompanied by processions, animal sacrifices, and music. When the plague was absent, she was also served, for “both the presence and absence of disease are manifestations of the grace of the Mother.” One notes the psychic need, that science cannot fill, to displace blame to a divine party, to turn punishment by the God back upon the self, and to propitiate and thank the divinity for not exerting its full powers if bestowing evil.

Divinity has often been assigned to kings and emperors. Egyptian, Assyrian, Roman, Chinese, Japanese, and the rulers of other cultures were considered gods, and worshiped in life and death. They have been pronounced by themselves and their associated elites as a relatives of gods or even one of the gods. This practice, so repulsive to democrats, is a means by which an elite and the people it rules can deal with and control the gods. At the same time, rule by divine kings is easier because the source of the rule is a god. He claim to divinity varies with the

secularism of the elite and masses, so that it is by no means rare that the god is usurped, overthrown, and killed.

In some forms of society, now extinct, kings were not only gods or semi-divine but were used as sacrifices regularly or in emergencies (often but by no means always in the form of temporarily appointed surrogates).

We see once again, as we no repeatedly and more clearly than in other life spheres, the basic functioning of religion to secure humans from fear of celestial disasters, and all fears of matters deemed to be connected with the heavens gone astray and chaotic. The Japanese Emperor used to be regarded as a god and was compelled to severely restrain his movements upon critical occasions, such as during some unusual celestial phenomenon. This catatonic state was believed to restrain the gods and heavens; if the god emperor does not change even his countenance, one believed, the countenance of heaven will not change either.

The puzzle of the god-heroes, with their half-and-half ancestry, still occupies us. Why must there be everywhere these hundreds of men and women who muddy the waters of great gods?

Typical explanations are unsatisfactory. It is said that gods and god-heroes are the same - a truth, but too limited a truth to answer the question. Others say that people want to be descended from gods, as, later, we shall see that they cannibalize their gods. This also is apparent. And some are content to say that gods are really only big heroes. Because of such explanations and simply because of the inordinate confusion from the plethora of names and deeds, the truth behind myth is difficult to find and, indeed, few are ready to believe there is a truth.

A quantavolutionary explanation of who and what are god-heroes can be set forth for what its worth. God-heroes are sublimatory. When, in periods following the direct and evident appearance and behavior of natural gods, there occurs a lull and a stability, humans, continuing their search of means to control

the gods begin the process of denying their existence by humanizing them. If people were left to pursue this process, the gods would be ultimately erased from the human mind (and history). The first phase, that is, consists of direct experience of gods in nature. The second phase permits god-heroes, the third phase pure heroes, and the fourth phase calls for plain human beings with typical human behaviors. To take an example: Mars is Ares; Ares becomes Hercules; Hercules is a god, but also Hercules becomes human, first as a god-hero; Hercules becomes quite human; Hercules becomes subject of a mass of folk tales; the unconscious artistic mind can push to all limits of the imagination with him.

What halts the process of losing gods entirely? On occasion (and many live in such expectations) the gods reappear, wreak havoc, and, so, self-sufficient, unassisted, full and direct god ship is restored. At the same time, the most obsessive and schizoid officials and prophets outlast the social sublimation that is occurring, and insist that gods *directly* are the only *authorities*, and will not let the process of creating god-heroes go too far.

Then, too, a minor phenomenon occurs, which is incorrectly elevated to the major explanation by uniformitarianism and psychic monolithics: pride of ancestry; elite self-elevation, etc.; “credenda et miranda” of ruling groups. Heroes are built into a group’s history: “A treason it is to deny them.” “We can’t eliminate god-heroes without denying the gods.” That is, the heroes of a ruling class are made divine. This, we stress, does happen but is not the primary and independent cause of gods and god-heroes. The impregnated themselves in the god-heroes.

There is little question that Campbell has succeeded in telling the universal plot of the hero found throughout the world from the most ancient times.

“The standard path of the mythological adventure of the hero is a magnification of the formula represented in the rites of passage: separation - initiation - return....

A hero ventures forth from the world of the common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons of his fellow men.”

How does this universal and even obsessive plot of mankind relate to the theory of quantavolution? Simply, we think. First we note cycle: the going forth ends in the return. Second, the world of the hero begins ordinarily, though almost always with premonitions and prophecy; indeed the ordinary may be actual nothingness. This may be interpreted as a regular order of the universe. Next come the disastrous experiences: a succession of personalized natural forces beat against the hero, testing his will to survive, and to control himself and the human and natural environment. When the forces have subsided or have been defeated, the hero returns to a stable social order upon which he bestows his moral and material gains.

The career of the hero thus mirrors the career of the gods, who mirror the career of nature. At first the tie to gods is direct; imitation is permissible, but not “heroic myth,” which would be considered intolerable insolence by the gods. Only after a period of the suppression of experiences and after a working out of psychic methods of dealing with them, can a human act out the plot of the gods and be called god-names. Once the process is begun, however, it has no end of sublimated ramifications until the gods are treated cavalierly and even de-sacralized - until the next catastrophic event.

Campbell joins himself to the psychoanalytic school that regards gods as non-existent psychological means for the human to jump beyond the ordinary world into the imaginary world; “gods are only convenient means to the ineffable.” They, and myth, help the mind to transcend phenomena and achieve the great void or openness of spirit. Although this theory is functionally true, it is very limited, and without realization of the grave primordial dependence of the human mind upon the real events of its history and of nature.

Connections between divinities or sacred thing and stars are usually the result, not of the activity of the stars nor of the playful resort to placing fairy tales among the stars, but of the fixing of the location from which a great event appeared to originate. The Deluge of Noah, by its many designations, is connected in widely-separate countries with the planet Saturn, but also with the star-cluster known as the Pleiades; some grave event affected the sky and earth when the Pleiades could somehow represent effects of Saturn. Scorpio is the background setting from which cometary Venus launched herself on a destructive swoop upon Earth. Scorpio is identified, if not before the event, then after the event, in new associations with the event. Early and later events occur in connection with Scorpio and by extension are associated with the Venus episode. Myths of one time and character become mixed up with others later on. The stars themselves, alone or in clusters, come to acquire legendary histories, and, as such, acquire future functions as places of resort or transubstantiation or limbo for worldly or otherworldly heroes, people, and divinities.

Plato insisted that the stars “are not small, as they appear to the eye, but each of them is immense in bulk.” Further every solid body of heaven had “a soul attached” to it. Thus Proclus in his commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus* declares that each celestial god has angels, demons, and heroes who are phases and extensions of it. And usually these characters have abodes or posting places in the sky. The rich Polynesian legends carry their heroes on many travels that are often imagined as terrestrial and maritime but which originated as travels of gods though the vast stellar and planetary regions. In one of its dimensions, the legend of the Argonauts is of a sky voyage that carried the adventurers to Circe (Corsyra, the Boreal Circle) where the island of Drepane (“sickle”) lay, beneath which was buried the sickle of Kronos.

Much of what might be told of angels is sung by Rainer Maria Rilke. Here we have the multi-faceted visions, the mixed love and terror, the mirroring of the human mind, and the sense of co-creatures of genesis long ago.

*Every angel is terrible. Still, woe to me,
I sing to you, near fatal birds of the soul,
full-knowing of you...
Early-achieved and over-indulged of creation,
you high ridges, dawn-reddened peaks of all genesis,
- pollen of the flowering godhead,
links of light, halls, steps, thrones,
welkins, shields of joy, uproars beauty
then suddenly, singly
mirrors scooping up outpoured beauty
back into your own faces.*

To the quantavolutionist, the presence of naturally occurring “angels” is logical and historical. More puzzling is whether they were comets, planets, or meteorites. Thus, the astronomers Strube and Napier attempted a natural history of the encounters between Earth and comets, and argue that in the early days of mankind disastrous comets were variously named and, when they had retired to the farther reaches of the solar system or had crashed or broken up, their natures and behaviors were assigned to the planets who were the regularly eccentric movers of the solar system.

That is, they would deny the asseverations of those such as Santillana, von Dechend, Velikovsky, Milton and myself who assigned the active roles in legends to the planets, and, in the case of the last three, give large changes in motion and behavior to all of the planets such as to fulfill the requirements of some angelic behaviors. This is not to say that comets did not occur, but that their original creation and impetus arose out of planetary explosions and disturbances. Too, it may be borne in mind that any body changing its movement in space will behave as a comet, growing horns and tails and trails and presenting a variety of apparitions.

It will take many years of study, and even then it may be impossible, to determine the historicity of the celestial solid body identity of even the more important “angels” and “sky-heroes” of world legend. Dwardu Cardona, in his studies of the Archangel Michael and others, has set an example of what must

be done on a large scale to eliminate the confusion of planets and angels.

Humans have been polytheistic even when their ruling religion states that one god and only one god exists. The people (and usually, too, their religious guides) establish a heavenly host (including devils) to complement, supplement, and assist the supreme god. So it was in the beginning and ever thereafter.

The propaganda for monotheism is massive, so that people claim to believe in one god while worshiping many. The monotheistic illusion occurs in two forms. First, monotheistic affirmations are made by people who upon psychological investigation obviously mean different things by the word "god." Thus, a sample of the American people in 1982 indicates that all except 2% believe in god.

If the same people were interviewed in greater depth, however, different 'gods' would emerge: a punitive god, a loving god, a *deus otiosus*, a god who pries into every nook and cranny of every mind, a helping god, a god who helps those who help themselves, a very human 'old man', an abstract principle of good, a god of true believers, a god of all people, and so on. Some people feel close to god, others not. God confides in some humans, but such an idea seems preposterous to other believers.

Then, other divinities would appear: the Holy Trinity, Christ the Son, the Virgin Mary, the Holy Ghost, each taking some godlike qualities upon themselves, supremely competent in some regard. Saints, agents of god, would appear in abundance. Many person's religious mentation and practices are given over to a saint, whose direct protection and assistance one feels to be superior to those services obtained from god the Father or God the Son; these latter, it seems, "are never there when you need them." The devil comes up with some or many divine qualities, almost always evil but "doing god's work," and god is often deemed helpless, even if by his own will, to rid the world of the devil.

Historical and contemporary heroes, such as George Washington and the incumbent President, find themselves contending with saints for the possession of divine qualities and the performance of miracles. In sum, a great variety of gods exists in fact under the name of The God. Such people may still be called monotheistic, so long as we understand the limits of this term.

Then other peoples of the world confess to more than one god. Such are the Hindus and Taoists, for instance. They need not agree, either, on the definition of the gods of their pantheon, any more than the Teutons, Greeks, or Romans would have agreed upon theirs. A peculiarity of the Hebrew religion of Moses was its very early achievement of an abstraction of the Lord which permitted an easier succession of gods (so long as integrity of a Hebrew nation was preserved). This is so despite many deviations and polytheistic cults, and much editing of the story to stress the unity of the Lord.

Not all early Hebrews were devout worshipers of Yahweh alone. Also, several rebellions against Moses were directed at his special, all-inclusive, exclusive god, Yahweh. Theologians have occasionally surmised, and correctly, I think, that Aaron, High Priest of the Jews under Moses, would have been fully tolerant of the worship of Baal, and that by Baal was indicated possibly more than one god besides Yahweh, possibly Saturn, Mercury, and Venus (to employ planetary representatives who had many parochial names.)

When Korah and his followers rebelled against Moses, one of their principal complaints, which has not been fully excised from the Bible and is also the subject of legend, was his suppression of their freedom to commune directly with the Lord. One encounters the same demand among the English Levellers of the Seventeenth Century, now raised against Oliver Cromwell, their Mosaic leader of the protestant revolution against the Crown. One god, the rebels are told, means a monotheism both of god and worshiper, by authoritative definition. This other kind of anarchistic monotheism cannot be

tolerated by a theocratic regime. Else every person would have his own god.

Jewish legends, which should be generously interpreted in the face of the monotheistic propaganda, accord a place for religious beliefs and practice connected with the Holy Spirit, The Archangels Michael and Gabriel (both identified with planets), the Moon hosts of angels, characters out of Sheol, and the Devil. Legends speak of these entities cordially and understandingly, as well as accusingly. From these stories and the historical record, it is clear that the victory of Yahweh was never complete among the Jews, and that much of the time he was “the professional man’s god,” the god of priests, military officers, and most kings and judges.

And so it went thereafter; the seekers and executors of “the Truth” sponsored monotheism. Moses was a scientist as well as a monotheist, I have concluded from my study of his life. Akhnaton, monotheist Pharaoh of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt, proclaimed his slogan as Truth *ma’at*, and was overthrown by polytheistic priests and populace. I suspect that he derived his monotheism from the Levant where he spent his childhood, perhaps even from Israel.

Polytheistic societies have had their monotheists, often connected with a free-thinking intelligentsia, akin to scientists. Thus, around 500 B.C., we find the Greek Xenophanes saying, “There is one god” (Fragment 23), and “He sees as a whole, thinks as a whole, and hears as a whole” (fragment 24). The philosophical discovery of a single god often, too, verges upon pantheism; the idea that “all things are full of gods” is not far from the idea that “god is in all things.”

When the Romans put down the Jewish rebellions of the first century and ultimately dispersed the population, they acted partly in order to defend the principle of extending religious rights to all gods that would tolerate other gods. This the Yahwists would not accept.

Meanwhile, the Christians, having promoted the Son of Man to become the Son of God, and then to become an identity united to a redesigned Yahweh, penetrated the larger population of the Roman Empire. They were persecuted as often as not on grounds that they would not tolerate other gods or worship the divine aspects of the secular power latent in monotheism; nor could the regimes succeeding to the Empire integrate the Christian doctrine firmly into their moral and legal order. The Byzantine Empire accomplished the first unification,. Only after a tine Empire accomplished the first unification. Only after a thousand years from its legitimization, could certain western regimes quite dominate monotheism.

For this triumph, they required a weakened Roman Catholic Church, a theory of divine right of monarchs, and ultimately popular nationalism that in democratic form placed god and country in the hands of the “people.” There came them in government and industry the theory of centralization, carefully developed over centuries by the church and embodied in many ideas, ranking from that of papal infallibility to proofs of the existence of god built upon absolute and extreme values.

Finally, monotheism could obtain support from science because science derived support from monotheism. Science has been a greater exponent and defender of monotheism than has traditional Christianity. Almost all scientists who have confessed to a religious belief have been deists, that is, believers in a god whose qualities and behavior bordered upon the laws of Nature. Nature (“herself,” we note in a singular transposition of sex) tends to acquire among scientific religious believers and scientific non-believers much of the omniscience, purposefulness, immanence, transcendence, power, absoluteness, lawfulness, orderliness, and responsiveness to human goodness and sin otherwise characteristic of the single deity. There is widely believed to be only one truth, one *ma’at*, in science.

In addition, then, to its other peculiar historical features, mosaic monotheism operates still as a vital feature in the ideological, hence structural, processes of modern religions of the Hebraic

complex, in conventional bureaucratic and single headed (especially charismatic) governments, in judicial fictions (such as “finding the law”), in international politics, in science, in pedagogy, in communist (but hardly “Marxist”) regimes, in tradition; philosophy as in most humanistic disciplines, and, of course, in the family.

The sociological treatise whose writing we are imagining would probably conclude that some of the most powerful and pervasive influences of monotheism have been manifested in “enlightened” secularized processes of the scientific revolution of the 17th to 19th centuries and the largely secular political history of the 18th to 20th centuries. Nothing of this should surprise us. Religion, we have already explained, seeps into all things.

A final comment on the effects of monotheism may be in order. Elsewhere, in *Homo Schizo I and II*, I explained the grave and genetic human problem of combining the several egos naturally emanating from the structure of the human mind into a single ego, “a person who can live with himself.” A percipient authority once termed the ancient Greeks schizophrenic, and central in the syndrome of their behavior was their polytheism. We can surmise that monotheism was not available to them to help “get their heads together.”

Further, we say that monotheism fashions a therapy for one kind of schizophrenia by creating another kind. It allows an orderly mind by pushing every object and tension onto one or the other pole - oneself or a god. In line with what we have already said of the effects and function of monotheism in society and science, we can expect from the monotheistic homo schizo a more orderly and consistent accretion of symbols and a greater psychological penchant for mental discipline and linear logical forms (as opposed to artistic, analogical and intuitive modes of thought). Monotheism thus can serve as a tool of inquiry in seeking to understand why certain groups and individuals historically and today have more disciplined minds, are logically consistent, and are superior at scientific investigation and human organization. We stress once more,

however, that monotheism does not clearly distinguish religions - all being polytheistic in one or more senses - but that a belief that one is monotheistic may create special qualities in oneself.

CHAPTER FIVE

LEGENDS AND SCRIPTURE

The biggest difference between myth or legends and sacred scriptures is that the latter are selected legends, called “divinely inspired or spoken” by their believers, which have been carefully guarded and edited to pursue the continuous but also continually changing religious goals of their custodians. Myth and legends, not so regarded, or whose line of custodians died out, were left like abandoned children to wander through time as casual history and unconstrained imagination, until caught up by scientific mythological studies.

Giambattista Vico was the first modern scholar to perceive this process when, two centuries ago, he wrote:

“The fables in their origins were true and severe narrations, whence mythos, fable, was defined as *vera narratio* (a true account)..But because they were originally for the most part gross, they gradually lost their original meanings, were then altered, subsequently became improbable, after that obscure, then scandalous, and finally incredible. . . These are the seven sources of the difficulties of the fables...”

One of many debts that we owe to Plato is his respect for myth and legend. He, too, fulminated at those who dismissed or, worse, corrupted history by their misuse of legends. In my skeptically minded exploration of the story of the destruction of Atlantis, the attitude of Plato mitigated my doubts. Plato goes out of his way to insist that the story be taken seriously, despite its prehistoric origins. Critias, his protagonist, is given to claim repeatedly that he heard and learned the story from his grandfather as a true and exact account. Significantly, to a modern mnemologist, Critias declared that although he had forgotten much of what he had heard of the previous day’s discussions,

he had forgotten none of what he had learned as a child about Atlantis.

The Atlantis story is generally disbelieved, yet if an educated unbeliever were to compare it with the story of the Deluge of Noah in the Bible, it would appear to be just as (im)plausible. It is no less specific. The “author” of one is Plato, of the other, Moses; who is more reliable? True, Atlantis is no longer to be found, above or below the sea, and therefore presumed not to have sunk; but the flood that climbed to great heights all over the Near East has vanished, too. Objectively, one would have to be as skeptical (and no more so) about the one account as about the other. The difference is that a great many millions of people believe in the Noachian Deluge because they believe in its sacred format, while the Atlanteans are long dead and the moral of their story - that Zeus destroyed them because he found their squabbling and vices intolerable - no longer lives in people’s minds.

A legend is history which has been largely unconstrained by realism and objectivity since the happenings that it describes. The boundary zone between legend and history is, of course, thickly populated. Thus, we have the well-known legend of the founding of Rome by close descendants of Aeneas, exiled prince of Troy, who settled in Latium. Many ancient scholars believed the story. Most Romans accepted it as true. The actual beginnings of the legend occur before Virgil, who related it in his epic poetry. If historical, the legend should go back to the also legendary beginnings of Rome, in the Eighth Century B.C. Then it was that Romulus and Remus, grandsons of Aeneas, built the town.

But while scholars have accepted the legend’s time of the founding, the Eighth Century, they have rejected the Aeneas story because the last war of Troy was placed in the Twelfth Century or earlier. However, recent studies have emptied Greek chronology of four to five centuries of time, which would permit placing Aeneas within a century of Romulus and Remus. To confirm the connection is a task of future research, but in support of it is the important fact that when faced with a

collection of practically all the evidence of art, archaeology, inscriptions, stories and ancient comment about the earlier times of Rome, one finds a striking gap in the collection extending between the 13th and 8th centuries, as was manifested in the great Bimillennial Exposition of Virgiliana held at Rome in 1982.

Another case of the interplay among history, legend, and scripture may be offered. It concerns the Christian Gospels of the life and work of Jesus. These are four in number, all written some years after the death of Jesus, under circumstances that have never been clear. Furthermore, as the reader will acknowledge, attitudes towards the Gospels and Jesus have ranged from the denial that he ever existed, passing through an acceptance of the Gospels as generally or exactly true, to other extreme ideas such as that Jesus was a Jewish radical rebelling against Roman rule, whose story was censored in the Gospels.

Dr. Livio C. Stecchini, both an ancient historian and a historian of science, for several years before his death taught a college course on the trial of Jesus. There he developed a theory that Seneca, the Stoic philosopher, dramatist, and Roman statesman, was the basic source for the Gospels. His brother met Saint Paul of Tarsus when Paul was imprisoned in Rome awaiting trial and execution, and Seneca himself could have interrogated Paul at will, given his high state position. That the Stoic and Christian positions on many ethical issues were similar - more so than the Mosaic-Christian position - has been often remarked upon. That Jesus follows the birth history of many Greco-Roman heroes is manifest: His father being divine, his mother human.

Seneca, said Stecchini, composed a great tragedy, later lost, and upon its manuscript and/or performances the Gospels drew very heavily. Thus it happened, as Stecchini has elaborated, that the plot of the trial and execution, the actions of the characters, and the timing and scenes of the Gospels are framed in the traditional structure of Greco-Roman drama.

As important as Stecchini's theory may be, we cannot treat it here as more than a conjecture. The conjecture, however, allows

us to make a point about legend and scripture. To the studious non-believer, sacred scripture is forever the source of historiography and the analysis of myth and legend. Scripture may be dissected from as many perspectives and in as many ways as the creative and scientific mind can imagine and instrument. On the other hand, to the studious believer, sacred scripture is first of all literally true, and all that the creative mind can imagine must be consistent with the literal truth. Even if, by every empirical test that is respected by historical and natural science, Jesus were deemed to have never existed (an unlikely prospect), the believer can continue to believe in the holiness of his mundane being and therefore in the literalness of the gospels, just as the Roman Catholic believer asserts in the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the veritable body and blood of Christ in the Holy Communion.

What we should then, by scientific standards, possess would be an entirely fictional and mythical complex contained in identical form in millions of cerebro-neural systems governing a host of behaviors. The reality of these systems and behaviors cannot and would not be disputed by science. Science would say, here we have a purely delusional system to accompany the larger delusional system that is a mixture of history, legend, myth, and non-reality known as the Old Testament or Mosaic system. And if all of the Old Testament were empirically disproved (also very unlikely), the scientist would then retire to the same position, namely treating the total New Testament - Old Testament complex as a purely delusional system with behavioral consequences.

Myth may be defined as a religious and aesthetic interpretation or story based upon legend and history. Its goal is to serve essentially non-historic functions while reminding its audience of a significant historical happening. Myth is closely related to rituals and sacrifices, which have the same goal, but, like sacred scriptures, are under severe theocratic constraints.

Myth is often indistinguishable from legend, but this occurs in part because the original culture to which a myth and legend belonged no longer exists to explain to us the difference

between the two; myths and legends intermingle in a flow through time which we experience much later and find indistinctly composed of both. The famous myth of Phaeton, who drives the Sun's chariot, burns up the Earth, and is destroyed by a thunderbolt of Zeus, is by common standards today an entertaining myth, but appears upon investigation more and more as a legend supporting an historical intrusion of a cometary body upon the Earth's atmosphere.

Sacred scripture consists of authoritative prescriptions of various compounds of legend and myth, frequently describing rites and commands for their recital, together with moral judgments. All legends and myths of the most ancient kind contain some sacred quality, but scriptures enhance sacrality by ascribing their own origin to divine or divinely authorized sources.

Debating sacred scriptures is deemed to be arguing with god, which is not only useless but sacrilegious as well. One effect of this view is to allow only such discussions and research whose intended effects are to prove the scriptures correct in morals, rites, and history.

This situation is antithetic to scientific method, which permits only hypotheses, never absolute and eternal truth. Nevertheless it often happens that believers in holy scriptures, when justifying and proving them, cast many bones from their campfires into the darkness where the jackals of science prowl. The very insistence of literal Biblicists has driven scholars to test the authenticity of some reported events, thereupon to learn to their surprise that these can in fact be confirmed.

One of these was the dropping of manna among the hungry Israelites in the desert. Fitting precisely the details provided in the Bible and legendary sources to the conditions under which manna-like confections could be manufactured - electrical discharges, high temperatures, strange atmospheric gases, molecular compounding, etc. - a considerable degree of confirmation can be accorded to the Biblical story, enough to swing the scientific balance in its direction.

Once more, however, I would stress that by proving the capability of natural causes to have produced the Biblical “miracle,” ordinary science erodes sacred scripture. It removes Yahweh from the manufacturing process and the product, and tends to make him a deistic god, that is, an ultimate cause or designer of manufacturing machinery.

Here, to be sure, Yahweh is still very close to events, according to Moses. But we recall that Moses is under suspicion of hallucinating; that is; another science, psychology, is working to erode the sacredness of the scripture, even while providing another form of natural explanation which authenticates in its own way the actions and speech conveyed in the scripture.

Sacred scriptures will always contain a high proportion of vague, indecipherable, incomprehensible, contradictory, and substantially untestable material. They will also have lost much, as historiographic methodology increasingly shows, owing to the alteration and accidents of their form of transmission, through cultural miscegenation, by reconciliation of older history with later history, by imposition of patterns of integration and new styles, by the collective amnesia that seeks both to forget actually and recall symbolically the traumas provoked in terrible ancient catastrophes, and by other changes in referents to accommodate ancient to present conditions, as a comet becoming a star, or as invisible electrical discharges which are now referred to as purely symbolic manifestations. Therefore there are limits to the scientificity that can be granted to the *Rig Vedas*, *Bible*, *Eddas*, *Book of the Dead*, *I Ching*, *Popul Vuh*, and other scriptures.

Nor can it benefit the credibility and influence of believers in sacred scriptures to be relegated by general consent, including their own, to the nonsensical remnants of the works. For example, many Biblical scholars refuse to employ or give credence to Talmudic commentaries and ancient legends of the Jews, when these documents will often testify to the authenticity of Biblical statements and elaborate them in a way that enhances their credibility.

Ominous conclusions emerge from these several pages. There is much history in myth, legend and scripture everywhere in the world. In a sense, all religions are desperately honest in their fundamental statements. Yet it is appreciated that, in a memory choice between a delusion and an historical fact, a religion will prefer the delusion. An attempt to “clean up” an historical religion by eliminating historical and empirical errors cannot succeed. Meanwhile we affirm that a religion cannot subsist on delusions alone: it must make historical and empirical statements. Are we to believe then that historical religion must be abandoned? We are not yet ready to answer this question.

CHAPTER SIX

RITUAL AND SACRIFICE

The Spanish conquistadors were appalled when they came upon extensive human sacrifices and cannibalism in Aztec Mexico some five centuries ago, and they killed an unnecessarily large number of this “master race” in the name of Jesus Christ. The bones were thrown to the dogs, which the Aztecs also liked to eat. An estimated two hundred and fifty thousand people were being killed and eaten annually, about one percent of the population of the whole region. It is argued by a student of the subject, Michael Harner, that this increment of meat went far toward making up for a serious protein deficiency in the Aztec diet.

When asked the reason for the sacrifices, which were conducted always with religious rituals, the Aztec spokesmen replied that the god managing the Sun depended on them. If the sacrifices were suspended, the Sun would not rise and set, and this glorious Age of the Sun would terminate in chaos. So quite aside from the matter to dietary protein, the stability of the cosmos was at stake. There had to be here, as elsewhere, a religious justification for cannibalism and human sacrifice.

The Spaniards were not impressed by this argument. They by now had many centuries of experience in confining their sacred cannibalism to the body and blood of Christ, which they absorbed whenever they partook of Holy Communion, which, if they were devout, ought to have been daily. The authority for this was Jesus Christ himself, as confirmed by no less than Saint Paul. This ritual sacrifice and cannibalism sufficed, and does to this day among the majority of Christendom. Nor did the Spaniards sacrifice animals, or even slaughter them ritually, which the ancient Jews, who almost always avoided any

semblance of human sacrifice, faithfully performed according to the precepts of the Old Testament, and the Muslim followed suit.

No culture has been free of cannibalism in its history, nor are most religions that profess gods fully exempted today. Apparently cannibalism touches upon some vital nerve center of historical religion. Else there would be only the onetime universal practice, which would have been stopped, and there would not have continued the substituted sacrifice and eating of animals nor the complicated symbolic sublimations whereby at the same moment religious believers both eat and do not eat human flesh. There has never been anything but sacred cannibalism except in dire life emergencies, such as occur now and then.

Actually it is easier to understand why cannibalism originated and flourished than why it has been severely constrained and, in some god-supporting religions, abandoned. Cannibalism, like killing others of his kind, is spontaneously human. It is a product of the set of mechanisms that generate when the self-aware, self-fearing human first appears. Seeing his alter ego in himself, he sees himself in other. He is continuously seeking to assimilate himself; he seeks to assimilate himself in others.

The identification with others is but a prelude to empowering himself by his ingestion of others. One does the same with the gods, here abetted in one's actions by the perceived behavior of the gods. The gods are frequently cannibalistic, he thinks. Gods fall to Earth or are cast down to Earth or are cast down to Earth and are devoured. Gods encounter one another electrically in meteoritic and cometary forms in the sky, are split up, are attracted and repelled.

When Giorgio di Santillana comments on the "baffling" bloody battles of the gods in Mesopotamian legends, he might as well have spoken of all legend and of the cannibalism of the gods. It may always be moot whether men got their ideas of warfare, sacrifice, and cannibalism from the gods. They say so in holy writings, but who can trust sacred scripture and get a degree in

astronomy without being as contradictory as the gods themselves?

A decline in celestial divine struggles and in the horrendous fears incited thereby in humans may explain why cannibalism has declined. The less fearful the human, the less inclined to sacrifice and the lesser the oblation. Man, it may be said to his credit, drives a hard bargain with his gods. The Aztec-Nahua rites were the last large-scale frank cannibalistic exercises, although small populations in Africa and Oceania pursued such practices until this century, and, from time to time, cannibalism is reported in chaotic and deprived human settings, as in Germany during the Thirty Years' war of the 16th century and in Cambodia during the terrible Indochinese wars of the mid-twentieth century.

Yet the Aztecs were two thousand years removed from what we suggested were prime catastrophic motivators of cannibalism. So far as we know, the latest universal catastrophes brought on by exoterrestrial forces were in the eighth and seventh centuries before Christ. Later, however, Mexico and Central America were subjected to extremely heavy volcanism (related, we think, to the earlier exoterrestrial episodes) with clouds of ashes that darkened the days and obscured the sun.

None can scientifically estimate the duration of memories. Many of today's customs go back thousands of years, indeed probably to the very first men, so obdurate and obsessive is the transmission of collective experience. With occasional heavy disasters and appropriate mythology, a people can behave in the ways of their remote ancestors.

None can deny that some of the Israelis of today see themselves as reenacting the scenes of the Israeli conquest of Palestine of 3400 years ago. Prime Minister Begin was himself a "Moses buff" who enjoyed greatly long discussions about "those days" with other members of the "Club." Yet he appeared to all the world as a substantially secular figure, operating efficiently amidst high Twentieth Century technology.

Although anti-religious in a conventional sense, but professing a racial credo claimed to be consistent with ancient Teutonic legend, the Nazis of Germany between 1942-5 consigned millions of European Jews of all shades of religious belief to death by methodical gassing and burning. They murdered many millions of other Europeans, too. The routine, almost automatic procedures used for most of this holocaust, and the absence of traditional religious rituals in its execution, seem to remove it from the scope of religious study. No conventional religion would tolerate such conduct.

Still, the initial impulse, in Hitler and other Nazis, was that of “purification of the race” and the creation of a new master race (“chosen people”) to rule the world. Nor did Hitler’s status rank below that of the divine heroes of legend; his book, *Mein Kampf*, was given to newly-wed couples in place of the *Bible*.

The rituals frequently staged by the Nazi rulers of Germany were as spectacular and soul-stirring as any in history. The holocaust, however, was not a matter of public spectacle and in this regard was a source of sacrificial strengthening in the minds of some thousands who directly participated in the killings.

One might venture that these were special ceremonies reserved for the Nazi priesthood. There is small chance that the Nazi genocides would have stopped with the Jews. Gypsies were already suffering the same fate. The treatment meted out to civil populations in Eastern Europe teetered on the brink of genocide. If the Nazis had won World war II, there would have been ample opportunity to extend the holocaust in East Europe, Asia and Africa; a successful cleansing genocide of six millions might readily extend to sixty million, or until some historical accident would happen to stop the process.

Sacrifice and anthropophagy are still in the religions of a billion people and in the everyday life of almost totally secularized billions. The typical American follows the secular rules of eating, being very early in life told, “Don’t just shove the food into your mouth.” We are advised that “it is bad to eat between

meals,” we are told to “wash before coming to the table,” to “set the table properly,” to dress decently for dinner, eat the proper foods in the proper order, to serve foods in the proper order (‘no dessert before the meat’), that father carves the meat, to leave a bit on the plate, to observe decorum at the table, and, in lesser numbers, to pray before every meal.”

There are a hundred or more such typical rules of etiquette, rationalized as prophylaxis, “consideration for the feelings of others,” and other particular explanations involving breeding and health. But there also were and are rules, of course, for the genteel cannibal, and well-educated sacrificer. The proverbial Englishman who used to dress for solitary dinner in the jungle was doing his part to hold the universe (and his own mind) intact. It was, of course, a joke when Cathedral Dean Jonathan Swift, viewing Ireland’s dismal economic state in 1792, sardonically recommended that the poor sell their babies to the rich for eating.

Slater, a careful scholar of the Greek mind, thought the Greeks more mad than other peoples. Especially did they dwell in their myth upon parents eating their children. This he blamed upon the fathers for putting down the mothers, who thus, in fancy at least, revenged themselves pedophagously.

The children of Alsace are treated around Christmas time (at the feast of Saint Nikolaus, December 6th), to cookies in the shapes of children distributed by Saint Nikolaus (Santa Claus) who is accompanied by Rubezahl, a gigantic man in a mask and cloak, a late impersonation of Wotan, and who can best be identified with Saturn, as indeed can Santa Claus. The one gives the imaged cookies to the good children; the other menaces the bad children. It should be recalled that infant sacrifices and cannibal rites to Saturn survived well into Christian times; in the present rites, unconscious of origins, the ancient rites are sublimated more or less in playfulness.

Ritual is prominently displayed in matters having to do with alimentation. But it covers all aspects of religion, therefore all aspects of life. There is a rule for everything. Man, deprived of

instinct, is a habit-former, an obsessional creature. Not only is his language founded upon obsessive reiteration, not only are his dietary manners as well, but likewise his sexual, affectional, social, agricultural, industrial, physical, and learning behavior. In all of these regards, religion and ritual come in the beginning of human existence and remain forever.

If religion persists despite the extensive and eroding process known as secularization, or rationalization, or pragmatization, it will do so logically in the centers of life prone to chaos and accident. That is, religious rites focus upon and persist in the fearful and catastrophe-prone areas and, as from a lantern, diffuse their light perceptibly and gradually into the secular.

For instance, baptism, ceremonializing the creation of new life in the world is a critical juncture, hence persistently ritualized; the Christian Baptists, who are relatively non-ritualistic and even anti-ritualistic, nevertheless are insistent that baptism into the church should occur by total immersion of the freely consenting new member in water to signify death of the old life and rebirth in the new. Baptism in a church is general among the French, even though the population has abandoned almost all rituals of the Roman Catholic Christian religion. Early Christian leaders believed that they had found in the Deluge of Noah the ultimate precedent and model for baptism, which repeats for each “saved” initiate the end of the wicked world and the entrance into a new epoch.

Rituals are centered upon the creation of the world and man, upon the first time everything was done, upon catastrophic breakdowns of an age and the beginning of new ages, and upon the *rites de passage* of human life -- birth, maturation, marriage, and death. Filling in as important subcategories of these are such features of human existence as warfare, where the gods are the models and the gods “Bless our weapons,” as the Kaiser of Germany (and many others) once prayed.

Celebrations of cosmic breakdown are a feature of the focusing of rites upon controlling the world against chaos, as in the case of the Aztecs. The New Year is ignored by no culture, because

it stands for the end of one age and the beginning of another; the usual rationalizations are afforded, that harvests are now gathered, that the calendar now repeats itself, etc. Nonetheless, beneath the considerable excitement, stirs the anxiety that the year may not repeat itself, the sun may not turn backwards to reenact the seasons, that once upon a time the world went out of control and could not provide assurances of the repetition of its orderly cycles.

The bacchanalia were orgies named for Bacchus or Dionysus, a god, reputed to have traveled the world with a wild troop of both sexes, carrying wands and serpents, acting out a mad composition of dancing, drinking, battling, sacrificing, cannibalism, and feasting. Regular and sporadic orgies, patterned upon the mythology, persisted for centuries before Christ until the Roman Senate with some success banned them for their flagrant challenge to morality and political order.

The crimes attributed to Dionysus were infinite, yet he received a place on the Olympian council of gods, replacing the gentle Hestia, according to one legend. Dionysus was a sky-god, perhaps originally an errant and destructive comet; the orgiastic behavior accompanying him resembles the kinds of social disorder that have been historically reported upon the fear-inspiring apparition of cometary bodies.

The saturnalia of the Greco-Roman world are more precisely applicable to prehistoric events, when the god Saturn was allegedly overturned in a revolt of his wife and children, particularly Jupiter. The last days of the year are regarded as the period when chaos begins, and the new year is seen as the coming of a new age.

“Even if, as the result of successive calendar reforms, the Saturnalia finally no longer coincided with the end and the beginning of the year, they nevertheless continued to mark the abolition of all norms and, in their violence, to illustrate an overturning of values (e.g. exchange of condition between masters and slaves, women treated as courtesans) and a general license, an orgiastic modality of

society, in a word a reversion of all forms to indeterminate unity.”

So says Mircea Eliade. Types of saturnalia are found throughout the ancient world -- the Middle East, the Mediterranean, China, Japan, and tribal societies of America. The Hebrew religion is not excepted, according to Santillana and von Dechend. And they continue in many places today,

Eliade merges the saturnalia with creation myths. This is contra-indicated by his own evidence. The catastrophe of Saturn and the end of its Golden Age involves the destruction of a preexisting, ante-deluvian, “old world,” and therefore comes long after the original creation.

The dramaturgy of the Babylonian Akitu Festival is illustrative of “the abolition of lost time, the restoration of primordial chaos, and the repetition of the cosmogonic act.” The god Marduk slays the dragon of chaos, Tiamat, and creates the cosmos from the fragments of its body, including man from the blood of a demonic ally of Tiamat. In the chaos all social forms are confounded, as in the Roman Saturnalia. It is probable that both creation and recreation are handled together in the drama; that is, Marduk (Jupiter) is in a sense a creation god but the Babylonians and Sumerians had older more authentic creation gods; Marduk would be, let us say, a re-creation god. Eliade implicitly grants this, when, in discussing the Akitu drama, he adds, “The creation of the world... is thus retroactualized each year,” and, a little later, “the hierogamy is a concrete realization of the ‘rebirth’ of the world and man.”

Eliade tends to force all celebrations and rites into *illo tempore*, “those first great days.” He has made an important contribution to the theory of the history of religions by assembling from all over the world evidence of the obsessive reiteration in human activities of the earliest days of mankind. However, he scarcely considers whether real events lay behind this compulsive return to origins of all peoples, a mechanism exactly consonant with Sigmund Freud’s mechanism of compulsive reenactment of traumas. Freud, when he essays to explain the origins of the

mechanism, postulates a primordial social crisis among the hominids whereby the “father” is killed by the “brothers” of a horde to gain access to the females whom the “father” monopolized; this theory is so weak, as I have shown elsewhere, as not to deserve treatment here.

Eliade does not offer a theory to explain compulsive repetition of chaos and creation, the most prominent of all ritual behavior. He quotes lines from Jensen’s *Mythes et Cultes chez les peuples primitifs* that call out to the original events: “The sacrilege of *not having remembered* is logically expiated by *remembering with special intensity*. And because of its special meaning, blood sacrifice is a particularly intense ‘reminder’ of this sort.” Perhaps relevant as well is an inscription of the tomb of the Egyptian Pharaoh Seti I: “The Light God Ra said: ‘You are forgiven your sins. The slaughtered victims remit your extinction.’ Such is the origin of the sacrifice of victims.”

The shocking psychic fear associated with human creation and the terrors of the active sky can be combined to explain why mankind has persisted, openly or beneath many kinds of sublimatory activities, in reenacting the earliest scenes. But the general catastrophes were several, accounting for the succession of gods, whereas the creation trauma was singular and unique. The human has been responding not only to the successive natural catastrophes which, of course were also treated as recreations. In racial memory the traumas blend over time. It is noteworthy that they have not entirely merged, with all distinction erased, but they have apparently merged enough so that on the one hand the historian and theorist Eliade does not separate them chronologically, and so that on the other hand most creationist scholars who hold to a literal interpretation of Biblical history are preoccupied with the Deluge of Noah, seeing it as the unique catastrophe that sculpted the face of the Earth.

Mankind, in bursting forth upon the Earth, experienced catastrophe, and thereafter was confirmed in his catastrophized memory by a succession of natural catastrophes. His global sense of the sacred, a sense that Otto and others have described

as ambivalent feelings of fearful danger and creative power, expanded with each quantavolution of nature and relaxed between the age-breaks.

Rituals are attempts at close encounters with the gods. They are a primary instrument for controlling oneself and the environment as the gods approach. We find the formula quite clearly perceived by theologians who refer to the sacrifice as the use of an intermediary, the oblation, to communicate between the mundane and the divine. "Sacrifice is ...offered to a divinity in order to establish, maintain or restore a right relationship of man to the sacred order," thus writes R.L. Flaherty in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article on sacrifice.

The means of ritually controlling the gods (for "communication" conveys the subservient theological mood more than it does the aggressive political mood) can be analyzed. They are scarcely exotic, though often esoteric. First, man behaves in imitation of the gods. This is in every sense the same as the behavior of the child with respect to his adult guardian and model. It is intended to gather in oneself the strength of the god, and at the same time disarm the god from directing aggression to him. "Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery," as the saying goes. So, if the god fights, the man fights. If the god rages, man rages. If the god bestows generous gifts, so does the man. And so on.

Appeasement of the god's proven potential for aggression against his very worshiper, as well as his enemies, takes many forms. Giving of one's most valued possessions is the most appropriate sacrifice. All manner of bribery, solicitations (it must be discovered what the god wants, even if by trial and error), prostitution (whether as vestal virgins or as temple harlots) -- these are common gifts.

Nor does worshipful man stop short of trickery. That god knows what one thinks does not prevent the most ludicrous practicality and flamboyant excesses. "It can't hurt to perform the rites." Do this and that, not because it is right in the eyes of god, but "lest you die;" ritual is to be performed, not

understood, nor does it matter to understand. The important thing is to obey the command. Miserliness is common too: "We are not sacrificing at all to Awwaw this year, since rain has fallen early," remarked an Iyala priest of Nigeria, quoted by Paul Radin.

Much of ritual therefore is a kind of tactical game to exploit the gods. The human encountering god is thrown into a panic, He often overcompensates and contradicts his own view of god as all-wise . He will stop at nothing to be on the right side of his god - never mind inconsistencies, preserving other life values, and saving a personal relationship. It is the politics of absolute autocracy to some, to others the politics of a monarchical court with its courtiers, to still others a two-person game, intensely personal.

Without a theory of origins and earliest history it is perhaps impossible to say whether man modeled kingship upon gods or gods upon kings, Whether rituals were practiced among men and them upon gods, or *vice versa*. Our particular theory here would make kingship and politics initially religious and soon afterwards transferred into a partially secular sphere, there ultimately to be pragmatized and secularized.

Later one could have a secular republic such as the U.S.A. or France, highly ritualized with specific rules excluding religion from the rituals. Finally one would arrive at the Marxist republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and others, where the very permission of religious ritual is viewed as an anomalous and temporary concession. Consistent with its denial of religious ritual, religious faith and revelations are treated as mental aberrations.

Religion without ritual is fear without defenses. Secularism without ritual must be the same. The suppression of supernatural belief does not eradicate the existential fear of man but only its referents - gods, spirits, etc.

The French Revolution after 1789 burst upon both the political regime and the church. Churches were seized, the clergy

laicized. A great Feast of the Supreme Being was inaugurated, conducted on the Champ de Mars in Paris. It is clear that the Supreme Being was Reason and Nature. Some churches were rededicated as temples to the Goddess Reason, who was sometimes represented by a pretty girl. New rituals were improvised to replace the old ones.

Numerous writers have pointed out that the supernatural is actually irrepressible and finds its way into astrology, "life in other worlds," "the unexplained" (an enlarging, logically boundless area), and the like. Furthermore, the religious finds its way into the divinization of political heroes -- "St. Karl Marx," "Comrade Mao," the entombed and preserved Lenin, the charismatic leader Mussolini, or de Gaulle, or Franklin Roosevelt, or Gandhi, et al.

We offer no argument against this line of reasoning. A religion of the supernatural, of faith and of revelation can be educed from such secular social phenomena. We would only wish to supplement them. There may be a reciprocal growth in secular ritual to accompany the loss of religion and its ritual.

Two phenomena accompanying modern secularization display conspicuous growth, and may be surrogates for ritual. One is bureaucracy, the other centralization. The two are interconnected: the logic of bureaucracy tends to centralization. The logic of centralization demands bureaucracy. One sees the shadow of religion and ritual in the two. The French Revolution, anti-religious, gave a great boost to centralized bureaucracy throughout the world.

Centralization is a search for a central truth and law toward which all procedures may be directed. Bureaucracy supplies the procedures. Large-scale armies, mass media, huge building complexes, human and computerized industrial giants, mass transportation, global planning -- all of these supply, whatever else they provide (and religion once supplied a distribution system for food out of sacrifices) reiterative, compulsive (compulsory, too), routinized activities lending a feeling of awe and security to those whom they engage and serve.

The idea of “efficiency” is offered frequently as a purely secular notion, an activity that can be carried on without a hint of the supernatural or the rite. In the first place, “efficiency” like “god” is all things to all people, hence is not to be accepted as meaningful at face value. Efficiency as a reduction of activity (energy) between two points (from “here” to a goal) to a minimum is flagrantly contradicted by bureaucracy. Efficiency seemingly contradicts sacrifice and ritual, superstition and magic, but actually religious ritual can and has been over the ages consistently intended to be efficient. The idea is not new; it is only aimed at different goals. One can be sure that ancient priests worked continuously to increase the efficiency of fires on altars.

The orders, rules, and laws, practically all now in written form, which pour out of the ruling organizations of the world take up many thousands of large volumes a year. Is this not ritualized behavior? It secures those involved from the nagging fear of existence, acting as a lifeline for the weak psyche to grasp. The summary effect of this overwhelming flood of order is to tell people what they must do and how to go about doing it, in the sacred written word of authority.

Gone for most modern people is the lifeline of religious ritual; in its place is secular ritual. We think of the novels of Franz Kafka (*The Castle, Amerika*) and of George Orwell (*1984*) to illustrate our point. It is untrue, although Dostoevski wrote so in *The Brothers Karamazov*, and one hears it often said, that “if God doesn’t exist, everything is allowed.” After all, is it not said of the great Soviet State that “Whatever is not forbidden is compulsory”?

The problem is too large for discussion here. I mean merely to add for consideration that the secularized world has a rich and abundant ritual, as well as secular divinities, charismatic experiences, and supernatural “pastimes” that are more serious than religion to their practitioners. The modern secular child knows more rules than the ancient religious child. And so, too,

the adult of this world today. At some stage hereafter we must contrast the two modes of life and evaluate them.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MAN'S DIVINE MIRROR

No god is the same to any two people, nor to any two sects. This is a psychological fact, akin to saying that no two people share the same experience. It would be a more definitive statement if the gods existed in no other realm except the minds of people. It also relates to the fact that no two delusions or hallucinations are alike, although especially when a group happens to hallucinate the same image -- an angel, say or unidentified flying object -- the description may be close, and when a mass of separate hallucinations is analyzed statistically, one does obtain averages and types.

When two people discuss a similar religious experience - a visual revelation of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, say - one can statistically adumbrate shared social and psychic features of the people that tend to qualify them for the experience, such as a deficient formal education, erratic and disturbed personal backgrounds, and so on. Cases where a team of scientific observers, warned and trained to be objective, are rushed to the scene to corroborate the vision are rare.

Even were such to occur, the new (and probably negative) evidence would have to be dismissed on grounds that the preparation for objective identification would necessarily incapacitate the team to share the experience. If the two people had seen a monster in the Sewanee River and called it a dragon and the team had hastened in with cameras and nets, an alligator of a certain size might be captured and the vision placed upon a firm scientific footing. It would not be surprising, then, if the original viewers claimed an improper identification, insisting that the wrong creature had been snared. Whereupon psychologists would once more be called upon.

That gods are often snares and delusions must be admitted. Yet the occurrence of the delusions, we have implied, takes on patterns evocative of actual events and of common mechanisms of the analyzed human mind. Natural expressions of high energy occur in cometary approaches to Earth, deluges of water and other material from the skies, anomalous intensifications of heat and cold by conflagration or sudden icing on a large scale, simultaneous large scale volcanism, and otherwise. Much evidence goes to show more of such catastrophes in ancient and prehistoric times than over the past 2500 years.

We say that the more frequent these occurrences and the greater their intensity, the more that gods appear and the more religious humanity becomes. If these be called gods insofar as they are apparitions and because of their enormous effects, then there is a real historical reason why mankind once was much more religious than now. Geology and archaeology can demonstrate (with much more research than they are inclined to provide) the actual basis for enhanced early religion. Psychology and the history of religion can show how the religious mind has expectedly peaked in these actual stress periods and subsided when the strains relaxed.

Practically all historians of religions of religion and renowned modern theologians have accepted evolutionary theories of cultural development in describing religious history. Even Henri Bergson who spoke of a “discontinuous evolution which proceeds by bounds” saw this progressive achievement of higher forms of behavior against the backdrop of an unchanging natural scenery. To all of such thinkers, religion must have progressed out of a rational advancement of humanity (even though Bergson credits mysticism with innovation in religion). That is, rationally evolving man creates ever more rational religion.

Without correcting the human mental infrastructure, they have placed an ever heavier superstructure upon man, not knowing that when man has assumed the burden of what they term rational behavior, it is because natural conditions have allowed

him to do so, and that this happened as much or more during the Golden Age of Saturn as during any period of modern times. Horses have not become smarter; horses have not; how should man have done so without a proven physiological alteration of his mind?

If one wishes to animate the ancient apparitions (metaphorically or delusionally) and assign the fantastically great natural events to interventions of the gods, defining gods as “whatsoever can produce such effects,” and further goes on to distinguish and assign gods to the different effects of, say, air, fire, water, and earth, there can be no logical objection. So long as one does not proceed beyond the evidence to impute motives, make misleading classification, and imagine an organization of the cosmos, none of which can be even partly demonstrated, the gods of nature can be said to exist as truly as “democracy” or an “infinite regression series.”

Here is where mankind gets into trouble with the scientific authorities of anthropology and psychology: it assigns a great many undemonstrable qualities to the gods and spirits. Then, hardly pausing, it fashions such qualities into a mirror of man, which like the mirror in the fairy tale of Snow White, so long as Snow White is sleeping, always tells the ugly Queen that she is beautiful. The mirror lies.

We can make two principal statements and several dependent propositions about the Divine Mirror of Man: first, all human qualities are found among the gods; second, divine organization portrays a reorganization of the human mind.

To demonstrate that every human quality has been sometime, somewhere, and even frequently, a divine quality requires hardly more than a list of references on the history of religion and anthropology. Let the reader make the test himself; let him try to think of any human action or trait, no matter how trivial or significant, which a god does not exhibit. The humans build a great tower to reach the sky. Very well, the gods have already their sky-topping mountains, their cosmic trees, their pillars of heaven, and many sacred paths by which souls can ascend and

angels descend. When the constructions threaten the gods, the gods destroy them. So it happened with the giants who piled Ossa upon Pelion to reach Zeus, who, however, overthrew everything, and as happened with the Tower of Babel, which the Hebrew Lord sent crashing by lightning and quaking.

But this is a sublime challenge, someone may object; an ordinary act is not divine, for example, excretion. But urine is a word from Uranus who copiously watered the earth in earliest times; and gold is the excrement of the gods to some people, perhaps remembering vaguely an exoterrestrial fall-out of the precious metal.

Is the god assembled anthropomorphically? The implication, even when not stated explicitly in sacred scriptures and legend, is that all of the traits of the divine do amount to a creature not unlike man. That Elohim created man in his or their image is, of course, a direct statement of the Hebrew *Genesis*, and if one were to compose a physiological mosaic from all references to Yahweh, the mosaic would evolve to look like Moses and act like him, including how Moses would like to have acted.

The Divine Mirror, it seems, is more perfect than the gazer. For it contains all of his qualities and all of his dreams and desires. Sometimes these are contradictory, but the mirror finds a solution. It may show a god with devilish features, or a god who is both female and male. Does it ever show a god who is both brave and fearful? Often; despite the fact that fear creates gods who are afraid of other gods, afraid of themselves, or mistrustful of their worshiper, this last being a kind of fear that drives gods (as it does men) to excesses of all kinds. So, indeed did the Lord behave toward Job, when the Devil drove him to be suspicious of his devoted and good worshiper.

In an early work, C.J. Jung wrote an *Answer to Job* where brilliantly but in a fundamentally naive form, he hints that man is too clever for God. "It were better," however, "not to wax too conscious of this slight moral superiority over the more unconscious God." One notes the marvelous schizoid behavior of the human, Job, when he is trying to control God. The making of

the ambivalent god and then the controlling of him becomes the greatest work of man.

God suspects and is jealous of the game that man is playing, a contradiction-in-contradiction, mirror in a mirror in a mirror, contra-contra-contradiction, which the schizoid can continue indefinitely, always one step ahead of God. In the story of Job, one finds the full range of schizophrenic conduct, including the creation of the Lord as the preferred instrument for working out human delusions. I trace the schizotypical character of the human race in other books.

Significantly, wherein lies at least his early naivete, Jung separately focuses his research upon Job and then upon schizophrenia. In the story of Job and God we even locate a tendency of humans to make of gods what they would make of themselves if they could, a kind of unreflective healthy instinctive animal, rid of the curse of self-awareness -- though this same self-awareness is the only true mark of the human and the source of god as mirror of man.

Usually, it is declared that the gods are not like man, because they possess an infinity of virtues. But who is to say what is virtue, except man-bound-in-culture? And what are the traits that appear infinite in the Divine Mirror but extensions of the valued traits of mankind. Even philosophers, and certainly theologians, submit to the dictates of mirroring when they accept the challenge of defining gods, and thereupon they say god is omni-this and omni-that : omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, omncreative, omnivalent, all-loving, absolutely just, and so on, setting, to be sure, on precisely those qualities that man has and wants much more of: power, respect, affection, wealth, skill, and knowledge.

To win a debate over whether all divinity that man can know is anthropomorphic hardly needs empirical evidence. So logical is the proposition, that it is probably tautology. That is, granted that man can only know by an extension of himself, the self becomes the model of the real, and no trait can be imagined that

is not already present in humanity. Therefore, in the anthropocentric sense, all divinity must be anthropomorphic.

In the days when gods were rampaging upon the Earth, theology was close to the disaster-ridden life of the people, naming and describing the fulsome operations of the divine forces, transmitting direct commands from above, concocting rites, and letting out the chains of fear carefully into sublimatory and practical behavior.

When the gods remove themselves somewhat, the chains are slackened. Language, symbols, and myth are allowed to bury memories deeper. Religion becomes less depictive and denotative, more general and abstract. Finally, philosophy is freed to play about the sacred and rationalize the cosmos. The gods of the philosophers are mirrored. "An otiose God, then, surveying unmoved 'this dusty, fuliginous chaos,' is the residuum of all this furious apostrophising." So wrote once Frederic Harrison.

We find that the most ancient people - and we are not told how - knew that the planet Jupiter had bands and the planet Saturn had rings. Probably they witnessed them directly and more closely than at any time until the year 1659 A.D when scientists observed them by telescope. By the time of Plato, several centuries before Christ, this knowledge was perhaps only present in legend, and was part of the legend that has the god Zeus Jupiter overthrowing his father, the god Kronos-Saturn, and binding him to prevent his return to power (and thus bring further destruction upon the world). The knowledge comes to us via the works of the platonic philosopher, Proclus, eight hundred years later(ca. 410-1485 A.D.).

Proclus, in startling clear language, but philosophical language, tells us that Jupiter, mighty and powerful, the supreme intellect of the universe, bringer of law and order to the world, asserts his own reason upon the world by putting the also perfect intellect of Saturn under bonds. Then, because Jupiter is logical and just, he binds himself, too, so that he also will be subject to his own ordering principles.

As I proceeded elsewhere to trace the development, the statements of Proclus exemplify how a primordial real experience becomes anaesthetized by its traumatic effects on humans; it is forgotten as direct experience. Yet it is remembered obsessively in the form of a religious creation legend, and then the suppressed memory and the legend are subliminated one more step into philosophy where they are used to express concepts of divine rule and natural law. The new ideas still give relief to the deep hidden anxieties over the horrible warfare of the gods, and they promote respect for human government and laws, which, it is said, are and should be modeled upon the behavior of the gods.

The nature of the gods is geared into the nature of religious organization. The jealous Yahweh of Moses was not the syncretistic, confederational, religious organization closely similar to the imperial, bureaucratic, secular-dominated, religious organization of Solomon. Forms of religious organization have been many, no two quite alike as we are prone to say. This, too, is a Mirror of Man. From the organization of spirits-shaman-tribal culture to the organization of the Holy-Trinity-priesthood-Roman Catholic world religion, variation is endless.

The descent of secular organizations from theocratic ones is well marked. For instance, the 13th century forms of political representation in England and elsewhere owed much to the representative convocations of the Dominican Order of the centuries preceding. Where not well-delineated, the lines of descent are concocted. In the 17th century, the Stuart line of England was “demonstrated” to go back to Adam, the First Man, and the divine right of monarchy was sustained. We might begin at the earliest age, and go on for many pages listing the religious structural forms and their secular descendants.

Suffice to say here that the secular forms, so far removed from the primordial religious ones, are nevertheless still “sky-struck.” Stars and totems adorn their banners; the right and the left factions stem from the Saturnian Throne in the sky; the

official secular calendars are largely religious in origin; the American dollar portrays ancient Egyptian cosmology; parades, processions, decorations, robes and a multitude of rituals precede and accompany officers even after they swear an oath, in which “So help me God” may be absent but the pledge is as symbolically complete and solemn.

Celestially or mundanely, man is operating with the same mental mechanisms and their external social extrusions. Symbolizing, displacements, identifications, memory, obsession, cognitive disorders, aversion to others - these psychic movements (were they not mostly unconscious, they would be called maneuvers or tactics) are all directed at handling fearfulness, and function in both religious and secular contexts. They are expressed in habitual, orgiastic, catatonic, and sublimatory behavior, which again have religious and secular counterparts.

The reader may have remarked that these mechanisms and expressions are schizoid and, if practiced in full conflict with the customs of one's group, would amount to a full-blown case of schizophrenia. The human is naturally schizotypus - I call him *homo sapiens schizotypus* elsewhere - whether speaking of religious man or secular man; when an individual diverges from the peculiar schizotypicality of his culture, he is identified as schizophrenic.

We would stress how much our view contrasts with the conventional approach, which analyzes the human as a rational individual with egoistic impulses who is struggling to reconcile these with social or altruistic demands. The distinction between self and society is itself a socially imposed distinction as it is presented, say, by Henri Bergson or the English utilitarians (whom he assails). The distinction is *ex post facto*. The *factum* is the schizotypical mechanisms mentioned above. These are what set into motion the operating religious and secular person. The “social” is immediately part of the person; it arises from the original gestalt of creation of the human species and in the birth and development of every person thereafter.

The experience of all peoples has been generally the same, intense ecological stresses anciently operating upon a divided, fearful mind. To say therefore that gods are “good” and men are “evil” makes anthropological history impossible, theoretically or as fact. We have already said that gods, relatively or crossculturally considered, display all “evils” and all “goods”. It matters relatively, not absolutely, that the burden of good and evil is shifted to certain different gods, devils or spirits going from one culture to another. The basic facts are the common experiences of “gods” and the ambivalence of the human mind in relation to itself. The ultimate expressions, such as “selfish” against “altruistic,” are just that - expressions - not the fountainhead of the social problem or of the problem of man against god.

The obverse to “how the gods could be believed to do evil to people” is, “how the gods could be believed to do good.” The efforts of humans to justify the evils visited upon themselves are extraordinary, considering the gravity of those evils. Some profound reason must prevent them from declaring that gods and devils are one and the same - a disaster. Why do they not recognize the animated high-energy forces of the world as the open enemies of the human race? Indeed, this did become finally the feeling of a great many people in modern times, whose change of attitude coincided with a de-animation of the forces of nature.

Primeval man and his successors found good in the gods because in the first place the ideal of the good god itself performed useful functions. The gods created man, and man was superior to the mammals whom he resembled and lived among. Therefore, gods should be loved for their creative deeds.

Still, gratitude is a refined sublimatory trait that would hardly result from this syllogism. There had to arise a satisfying powerful identity out of the gestalt of creation: the creative god was built into the mind of the creature; it was his first projective delusion. His first great relief from fear was placing the responsibility for his creation, not upon himself (an idea that

must promptly have occurred) but upon “some himself not himself,” ergo a god. Who denied god, denied himself; who denied himself would not survive. The madness of great delusions was the condition for survival.

There remained only the elaboration of the madness into human norms. A quick transfer of traits occurred - man gave to god all of his abilities and took them back as blessed gifts, down to the rudiments of stone age technology, the very fashioning of a club. Because of the obvious powerfulness of the gods, the gifts acquired power in the human mind, and man would step forward to control the world with an obsessive confidence, a false confidence, very often, yet with enough successes to accredit the transfer. At the same time, man could deny his personal responsibility for all that he was creating.

Further, by imitating the gods, invention was promoted. More and more objects and procedures for controlling himself and others were imagined to descend from the gods and more and more were created under divine inspiration. This despite the interference of the gods thenceforth in inventions of all kinds, wherein nothing could be invented and applied unless it had come from the gods or was blessed by the gods. The psychological mechanism had its drawbacks; in the most peaceful and pragmatic periods, the wellsprings of invention were overlooked, while the subservience of practical innovation and social reforms to religious dogmas and rituals was damned.

The mechanism for projecting and retrojecting gifts of power and techniques was in itself adequate to explain why a punitive god could be assigned benevolent and beneficent qualities. Yet it was not the only source of the idea of the good god. The first mutant humans came into being in the midst of chaos and destruction. That they had survived while all around them lay a biosphere of death and destruction, including what had been their own kind, was a miracle; their minds were now equipped to reflect upon it.

Mourning was a trait already possessed; mammals and primates mourn. Beyond mourning, however, or if human mourning

were to be distinguished, was a new consciousness of the self, an individuation from the group, that could see what had happened to others, see what oneself had escaped, and assign to the escape a selective feature, a blessedness, a sense of being chosen for survival.

Thus arises the quality of personal satisfaction and joy amidst ruin, that interjects itself into the most grandiose human tragedies, and causes people to dance, laugh, and sing when the world shakes and burns around them. It was a primordial human acquisition, directly connected with the animated forces of destruction. Sailors, returning aboard a ship off of Krakatoa in 1883, who watched the desolation of their families on the shore from volcanic explosion and tsunamis, laughed and jumped with joy that they were being spared. Hysterical conduct, to be sure, in awful fear, but such is the nature of hysteria, and laughter often is a fringe around hysteria.

The divine identification and imitation justified and provided morale for survivors to revive and conquer. A newly-acquired super-mammalian aggression abetted the profits of survival. Those who survived could move out, reinforced by grace of the gods, and in imitation of the gods, readily loot, kill, or enslave whoever remained alive and strange. The material gains of aggression were thenceforth regarded in the category of gifts of the gods, and regularly some portion of them was returned to the gods by means of sacrifices. From old Mexico Brundage gives us a song composed by the Emperor Axayacatl: "The flower death (for sacrifice and cannibalism) came down to Earth. It came here. It had been created in Tlapallan (Heaven)."

Nor were these the only material benefits that came from the divine delusion. On some occasions, carbohydrates descended from the sky, notably during times associated with terrifying celestial phenomena between 3000 and 3500 years ago when *manna*, *soma*, and *ambrosia* were provided to starving survivors. This I explain in *The Lately Tortured Earth*, where too, many legends are reported insisting that copper, gold, silver, petroleum and iron were exploded or dropped onto Earth and used by their finders. Meteoric iron was commonly used

long before the controversial “Iron Age” and may have fallen in amounts sufficient to institute this age. Myths of dragons burying gold are met with. And so on. The stone (and wood) age might have gone on forever if the surface of the Earth had not been blasted into metals and by metals from the skies. If this is a fact, then mankind would be historically as well as psychologically blessed by the gods.

Fountains and springs of water erupted, too, in many places, even where the pre-existing waters had been diverted or buried, so that the gods could be said to have first removed good things and then relented and given them back. The gods, sang Homer, were the givers of all good things. Jupiter took away fire to punish mankind; the god-hero Prometheus stole it and gave it back to man; Zeus enchained and tortured Prometheus eternally for his gift. But the fire remained.

We have spoken largely of displacement, identification, projection, and aggression heretofore. Alongside these mechanisms moves habit, the human’s answer to the blunting of instinctive behavior during the creation of self-awareness.

Outstanding in human behavior is the voluntary and unconsciously motivated repetition of actions in every sphere of life. In individuals, instinct serves for habit, the distinction generally being that instinct is untrained. Habit and custom are inculcated by training or imitation. Not only is habit pervasive of normal activities of individuals and groups. It is also characteristic of many psychopathologies, where it is called obsession.

The origin of habit and custom lay in the primeval fears of the self-aware human, and the discipline that such fears sub-consciously and later consciously impressed upon him. First came schizophrenic obsession. The more intense a blow or trauma to the body (mind), the more intensely and frequently it is autoinflicted neurologically afterwards. An obsession is an auto-inflicted reiteration of some or all of the initial reaction to a trauma.

An obsession discharges quantas of the stored force of the trauma, which originally could be tolerated short of death only by its redistribution (i.e., memorizing) in successively less related circuitries contacting the affected area. Some effect of a trauma also are discharged through interfering circuitries, some of which were developed in primeval man analogously obsessive and some in non-analogous behavior, especially symbolic manifestations and erratic uncontrolled seizures.

These forms of dissipating the impactive force of the trauma are founded upon analogous primate behavior. They establish themselves as quasi-voluntary and voluntary activities of the split self, which more or less observes its own reactions and discharges. They are seen by men as voluntary because the self views the action as a decision of two or more compromising internal selves.

Four major patterns of expression emerged finally from the primeval trauma: catatonic, obsessive, sublimatory, and orgiastic behavior. Authentically human behavior was ever after derived and composed from one or more of these patterns. Hence all human behavior reflects, no matter at how great a distance in time and pragmatic relevance, the traumas of cosmic destruction and creation that made and successively battered primeval humans.

The catatonic consists of activity whose primeval function was to keep the world unchanged. The Atlas who held the world on his back was a catatonic symbol of arrested movement; when Atlas shrugs, the Earth shakes, The Hindu Manu who held the world up for ages while standing on one leg and meditating is another catatonic god. Since the Hebrew god rested on the seventh day of creation and ordered his example to be followed forever, many millions of people have dreaded to violate the Sabbath, fearing that the world would be upset in various ways by the angry God.

Physiologically, catatonism is a freezing effect, to prevent the conscious from opening up blockages of suppressed fear. It acts promiscuously, but also in more sophisticated ways, that is,

partially and selectively, reluctantly forced to do so by other more determined modes of coping with the needs of the organism.

Primevally, the person froze with fear. Symbolically, humanly, the meaning of freezing with fear became the preservation, at all costs, of existing circumstances, the arresting of the world, of sense intakes, of outputs, of activity, and especially of free or creative activity, all both individually and socially. By projection, if the person and group stop, the disorderly processes of nature will stop; the disorderly processes are deemed to proceed because people are moving and acting.

Obsessive activity has the function-effect of sustaining a line of behavior, of repeating it endlessly with as little deviation as possible. The first symbols and sighs of the self-aware persons were naming and ejaculating. Almost instantly this became liturgy, a continuous repetition -- expressive, denotative, and expiatory --- of anguish, labeling of the cause of anguish, and formula for control of the cause, all in one utterance, repeated continuously. Thenceforth, over thousands of years, the obsessive in symbol and behavior become infinitely varied and yet basically recognizable as originating in fearfulness and its reciprocal of ritual controls. Habit, "the great flywheel of progress" (William James), and custom came to dominate human affairs.

Sublimatory activity functions and has the effects of discharging impulses that are traumatically aroused, together with associated agglomerated impulses, by deviant behavior that simultaneously and subconsciously is analogous enough to the impulses to be organically tolerated and yet sends the organism in new directions that not only complement and supplement but also contradict other behaviors. Even when contradictory, the sublimation is subconsciously recognized by others to be providing such discharges and is accepted and even encouraged by them.

Symbolic communication is heavily developed by and originates in sublimatory behavior because it is like an endless

treasury of ambiguities, flexible for the most remotely analogous tie-ins of original impulses and ultimate conduct.

Orgiastic behavior functions and has the effects of discharges through explosions of the original traumatic force. It has the characteristics of erratic displays of energy, of spastic behavior, and acknowledged as such: it is actually approved not despite, but because of, its senselessness. It demands death, sacrifices, cannibalism, self-mutilation and the wounding of other human, animal, plants, property. It is both suppressed by and revenges itself upon the other patterns of behavior-erasing obsessions in a burst of destructiveness; alternating with catatonic behavior sometimes side by side; destroying and giving new forms to sublimatory behavior.

The cumulative effect of the four behavior patterns of man was to set him apart as a voluntary self-mover. The continuous gap between the two aware selves allowed a kind of fission-fusion reaction on an energy scale immensely larger and more efficient than that of which animals and hominids were capable. Projects of many different kinds could be generated and carried on. Combinations of the four patterns provided a large variety of model or test cases, the effects of which might be pragmatically adjudged good or bad, before deciding to adopt them as ordinary behavior.

The divine, thereupon, becomes a mirror image of the human, just as schizotypical as, or more so, than man, exhibiting human traits, mechanisms, and expressions. No two minds can see the same image in the mirror. This mirror is emphatically not divorced from human experience. It reflects indeed man's most destructive and exhilarating experiences. All gods are connected with disaster, the greater the god the more central his role in ancient disasters whose scope is unimaginable to most people today. The primordial human mind governs the modern mind, being the same mind, being retentive of the same experiences. We presented the view earlier that all religion goes back, overtly or covertly, to the first gods. We presented arguments that mankind was a creation of the very experiences that presented the gods to view. In discussing scripture and

legend, we mentioned that the figure of Christ was heavily Greco--Romanized, perhaps even formed for the Gospels by a philosopher-dramatist, Seneca.

The reader may then have wondered: since early Christians had a New Testament, a new model of God and were antisemitic (Seneca was so too), why did they not cut their ties with Old Testament Judaism? The reason, I think, is clear: the Christians needed the catastrophic history afforded by Old Testament religion; they required the Creation chaos, the Flood, the harassment of Job, the Tower of Babel, the Destruction of the Cities of the Plain, and the Exodus. Otherwise, they would have condemned themselves to early obsolescence and extinction.

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